Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage collision on upgrade corrupts s_flashLoanFee, breaking flash loans

Root + Impact

Description

ThunderLoan is a UUPS upgradeable proxy, so the storage layout must stay identical between versions. Each state variable occupies a fixed storage slot, and the upgraded implementation must preserve that ordering. The problem is that the V2 (ThunderLoanUpgraded) changes the layout: V1 declares `s_feePrecision` (a storage variable) followed by `s_flashLoanFee`, while V2 removes `s_feePrecision` and turns FEE_PRECISION into a constant (which occupies no slot). This shifts `s_flashLoanFee` into the slot that previously held `s_feePrecision` (1e18). After the upgrade, the flash loan fee is silently corrupted.

// V1 (ThunderLoan.sol) // V2 (ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol)
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot 1 uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot 1 @> collision
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot 2 uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION; // no slot
// After upgrade: s_flashLoanFee reads slot 1 == old s_feePrecision == 1e18

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Occurs immediately and deterministically the moment the contract is upgraded to ThunderLoanUpgraded.

Impact:

  • s_flashLoanFee is corrupted from 3e15 (0.3%) to 1e18, an enormous value.

  • Flash loan fees become astronomically high, breaking the core flash loan functionality and making the protocol unusable.

Proof of Concept

Reading the fee before and after the upgrade shows it jumps from 3e15 to 1e18, with no one modifying it — purely due to the storage slot collision.

function test_PoC_StorageCollisionAfterUpgrade() public {
uint256 feeBefore = thunderLoan.getFee(); // 3e15
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded));
uint256 feeAfter = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(thunderLoan)).getFee(); // 1e18
assertNotEq(feeBefore, feeAfter); // fee corrupted purely by the upgrade
}
// Logs: fee 3e15 -> 1e18 after upgrade

Recommended Mitigation

Never remove or reorder storage variables in an upgradeable contract. Keep s_feePrecision in its original slot (even if unused), or use a storage gap pattern. Removing it and converting to a constant shifts all subsequent slots, corrupting state.

// In ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol, preserve the original storage layout:
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
+ uint256 private s_feePrecision; // keep this slot occupied to preserve layout
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
- uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
mapping(IERC20 token => bool currentlyFlashLoaning) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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