Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

UUPS upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded shifts storage slots and bricks flash-loan fees at 100%

UUPS upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded shifts storage slots and bricks flash-loan fees at 100%

Description

  • Normal behavior: ThunderLoan declares state in the order s_tokenToAssetToken, s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning; a UUPS upgrade must preserve the storage slot layout.

  • Specific issue: ThunderLoanUpgraded replaces the s_feePrecision state variable with a constant FEE_PRECISION that occupies NO storage slot, so every later variable shifts one slot up: s_flashLoanFee lands on the old s_feePrecision slot (value 1e18) and s_currentlyFlashLoaning lands on the old s_flashLoanFee slot (value 3e15). After upgradeToAndCall via _authorizeUpgrade() (ThunderLoan.sol:280), getCalculatedFee() multiplies by s_flashLoanFee == 1e18 — a 100% fee — and the reentrancy latch reads stale non-zero data.

// v1 (ThunderLoan.sol)
mapping(address => AssetToken) private s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot 0
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot 1 = 1e18
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot 2 = 3e15
mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // slot 3
// v2 (ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol)
mapping(address => AssetToken) private s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot 0
uint256 private constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // NO SLOT
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot 1 -> reads old s_feePrecision = 1e18
@> mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // slot 2 -> reads old s_flashLoanFee = 3e15

Risk

Likelihood:

  • The README explicitly places the ThunderLoan → ThunderLoanUpgraded migration in audit scope, so the upgrade path is intended to be executed.

  • Any owner-driven upgradeToAndCall() triggers the collision immediately; no market conditions required.

Impact:

  • Every flash loan charges a 100% fee (amount * 1e18 / 1e18), making flash loans unusable — permanent protocol DoS until a second upgrade.

  • s_currentlyFlashLoaning reads the stale non-zero slot value 3e15, corrupting the only reentrancy/repay state the protocol relies on.

Proof of Concept

Explanation: deploy the ERC1967 proxy + v1 implementation and initialize() (writes s_feePrecision = 1e18, s_flashLoanFee = 3e15); fund the pool via deposit(); deploy ThunderLoanUpgraded and call upgradeToAndCall(newImpl, "") as owner through _authorizeUpgrade() at line 280; then getCalculatedFee(token, amount) returns amount (100% fee) instead of 0.3%, flashloan() becomes unusable and the latch reads stale data. PoC requires forge verification.

// 1. ERC1967Proxy proxy = new ERC1967Proxy(address(new ThunderLoan()), "");
// ThunderLoan(address(proxy)).initialize(address(poolFactory));
// 2. deposit liquidity so flashloan can run pre-upgrade.
// 3. owner: proxy.upgradeToAndCall(address(new ThunderLoanUpgraded()), "");
// 4. assertEq(upgraded.getCalculatedFee(token, 1000e18), 1000e18); // 100% fee
// 5. observe flashloan unusable and s_currentlyFlashLoaning reading stale 3e15.

Recommended Mitigation

Explanation: storage layout must stay append-only across upgrades; keeping the s_feePrecision slot occupied (or reserving a placeholder) preserves the alignment of s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, so post-upgrade reads return the intended values. A CI storage-layout diff between v1 and v2 catches any future shift before deployment.

--- a/src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
+++ b/src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
@@ storage layout @@
mapping(address => AssetToken) private s_tokenToAssetToken;
- uint256 private constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
+ uint256 private s_feePrecision; // keep v1 slot 1 occupied
+ uint256 private constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!