Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

UUPS upgrade to `ThunderLoanUpgraded` collides storage — `s_flashLoanFee` inherits the old `s_feePrecision` slot (1e18), inflating the fee to 100% of principal

Description

Normal behavior: a UUPS upgrade must preserve the storage layout so persisted values keep their meaning.

Specific issue: ThunderLoan declares s_feePrecision (a storage slot) then s_flashLoanFee. ThunderLoanUpgraded removes s_feePrecision and makes FEE_PRECISION a constant (which occupies NO storage slot), so every following variable shifts up one slot. After upgradeToAndCall, the proxy's storage is unchanged, so the new s_flashLoanFee reads the value the old s_feePrecision left behind (1e18) instead of 3e15.

// ThunderLoan.sol
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot N @> storage
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+1
// ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // @> now at slot N -> reads old s_feePrecision (1e18)
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // @> constant, no slot -> layout shifted

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Deterministic on the planned upgrade (which is explicitly in scope).

Impact:

  • getFee() returns 1e18 instead of 3e15; getCalculatedFee charges 100% of principal (proven 333x jump). Flash loans become economically impossible and fee accounting is permanently corrupted on a live protocol. The s_currentlyFlashLoaning mapping base slot also shifts, orphaning its entries.

Proof of Concept

test/unit/UpgradeCollisionTest.t.sol deploys the proxy on ThunderLoan, upgrades to ThunderLoanUpgraded, and asserts the fee is corrupted (and that getFee() equals the raw leftover in the old precision slot). PASSES.

Run: forge test --match-contract UpgradeCollisionTest -vv

BEFORE: getFee() = 3000000000000000 (3e15, 0.3%)
BEFORE: getCalculatedFee() = 300000000000000000 (3e17)
AFTER : getFee() = 1000000000000000000 (1e18 <-- corrupted)
AFTER : getCalculatedFee() = 100000000000000000000 (1e20, 100% of principal)

Recommended Mitigation

Preserve the exact slot of every retained variable. Keep s_feePrecision as a storage variable (do not convert to constant), or insert an equal-width placeholder at its slot.

+ uint256 private __gap_feePrecision; // keep slot N occupied
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // stays at slot N+1
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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