Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage collision after upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded corrupts s_flashLoanFee and the flash-loaning mapping

Root + Impact

The audit README explicitly puts the upgrade from ThunderLoan to ThunderLoanUpgraded in scope. ThunderLoanUpgraded converts the storage variable s_feePrecision into a constant (FEE_PRECISION). Constants are not stored in contract storage, so every state variable declared after it shifts up by one storage slot and collides with the layout the proxy already uses.

Description

ThunderLoan (v1) storage after the token mapping:

  • slot 1: uint256 private s_feePrecision (= 1e18)

  • slot 2: uint256 private s_flashLoanFee (= 3e15)

  • slot 3: mapping(IERC20 => bool) s_currentlyFlashLoaning

ThunderLoanUpgraded (v2) removes s_feePrecision from storage:

uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // @> now sits in v1 s_feePrecision slot -> reads 1e18
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // @> constant: not in storage, shifts every later slot
mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // @> base slot collides with v1 fee slot

After the proxy delegatecalls the new implementation, s_flashLoanFee reads the value stored for the old s_feePrecision (1e18 instead of 3e15), and the s_currentlyFlashLoaning mapping base slot collides with the old fee slot.

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • The upgrade is a stated, planned action and is explicitly in audit scope.

  • The corruption is deterministic: it manifests on the first read of s_flashLoanFee after the upgrade, with no special preconditions.

Impact: High

  • getCalculatedFee uses the corrupted s_flashLoanFee (1e18), inflating every flash-loan fee by ~333x and breaking fee accounting for all users.

  • The s_currentlyFlashLoaning mapping collides with the old fee slot, corrupting in-progress flash-loan tracking used by flashloan / repay.

Proof of Concept

Foundry test (passes) that upgrades the proxy and reads the fee before/after:

function test_upgradeStorageCollision_corruptsFlashLoanFee() public {
uint256 feeBefore = thunderLoan.getFee(); // 3e15
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded));
uint256 feeAfter = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)).getFee(); // 1e18
assertEq(feeBefore, 3e15);
assertEq(feeAfter, 1e18); // collided with old s_feePrecision
}

Result:

s_flashLoanFee before upgrade: 3000000000000000
s_flashLoanFee after upgrade: 1000000000000000000

Recommended Mitigation

Never remove or reorder existing storage variables in an upgradeable contract. Keep the slot occupied:

- uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
+ uint256 private s_feePrecision; // keep the storage slot to preserve layout
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;

Set s_feePrecision in a reinitializer if needed, or adopt OpenZeppelin’s storage-gap pattern.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 19 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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