Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`s_feePrecision` removed in upgrade without storage gap → `s_currentlyFlashLoaning` shifts by one slot and reads stale data

Description

  • Normal: Upgraded contracts maintain the same storage layout as their predecessors. OpenZeppelin's upgrade patterns recommend storage gaps to reserve slots for future variables.

  • Bug: ThunderLoanUpgraded removes s_feePrecision (moved to a constant) without adding a placeholder. All subsequent storage variables shift up by one slot, reading data from their previous positions.

// ===== ThunderLoan.sol (original) =====
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // Slot N+1
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // Slot N+2
mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // Slot N+3
// ===== ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol (upgraded) =====
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // CONSTANT — no storage!
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; //@> Now at N+1 (was N+2!)
mapping(IERC20 token => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; //@> Now at N+2 (was N+3!)

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Deterministic — every upgrade from ThunderLoan to ThunderLoanUpgraded triggers this

  • The storage layout mismatch is a compile-time guarantee visible in the source code

  • No runtime condition can prevent or mitigate the collision

Impact:

  • s_flashLoanFee reads from the old s_feePrecision slot — fee value is whatever feePrecision was

  • s_currentlyFlashLoaning reads from the old s_flashLoanFee slot (value 3e15) — every token appears to have an active flash loan

  • Protocol's reentrancy guard for flash loans is permanently broken

  • All existing depositor positions become inaccessible via mapping misalignment

Proof of Concept

Source code diff confirms the collision:

Original storage:
N: s_tokenToAssetToken
N+1: s_feePrecision = 1e18 (default)
N+2: s_flashLoanFee = 3e15
N+3: s_currentlyFlashLoaning (empty mapping)
After upgrade, code reads:
N: s_tokenToAssetToken ← correct
N+1: s_flashLoanFee ← reads 1e18 from old s_feePrecision slot! (should be 3e15)
N+2: s_currentlyFlashLoaning ← reads from old s_flashLoanFee slot (3e150 = corrupted!)
forge test --match-test test_StorageCollisionOnUpgrade -vvv
# Result: [PASS] test_StorageCollisionOnUpgrade() — storage collision confirmed.

Recommended Mitigation

+ // ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol — preserve storage layout
+ uint256 private s_feePrecision_deprecated; // Keep slot N+1 occupied
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // Stays at N+2
mapping(IERC20 token => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // Stays at N+3
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 3 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!