Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

`setAllowedToken(token, false)` deletes asset token mapping → all depositor funds for that token permanently locked

Description

  • Normal: Disallowing a token should prevent NEW deposits but still allow existing depositors to withdraw.

  • Bug: setAllowedToken(token, false) calls delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token], which makes the revertIfNotAllowedToken modifier reject ALL operations — including redeem().

// src/protocol/ThunderLoan.sol:238-243
function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner {
if (!allowed) {
delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; //@> Destroys mapping — cuts off ALL access
}
}
// Modifier used by both redeem() and flashloan()
modifier revertIfNotAllowedToken(IERC20 token) {
if (s_tokenToAssetToken[token] == address(0)) {
revert ThunderLoan__NotAllowedToken(); //@> Blocks ALL operations after delete
}
_;
}

Risk

Likelihood:

  • Owner calls setAllowedToken(token, false) — a legitimate operational action (deprecating a token)

  • Once called, the condition is permanent — no recovery mechanism exists

Impact:

  • ALL depositors in the disallowed token lose access to their funds immediately

  • No emergency withdrawal or migration path exists

  • Funds are locked FOREVER — even the owner cannot recover them

  • Every depositor's entire balance becomes inaccessible

Proof of Concept

Code trace:

  1. setAllowedToken(token, false)delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token] (line 243)

  2. User calls redeem(token, amount) → hits revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) modifier (line 279)

  3. Modifier checks s_tokenToAssetToken[token] == address(0) → TRUE → revert ThunderLoan__NotAllowedToken()

forge test --match-test test_DisallowTokenLocksDeposits -vvv
# Result: [PASS] test_DisallowTokenLocksDeposits() — fund lock confirmed.

Recommended Mitigation

+ mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_tokenDepositAllowed;
+
function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner {
- if (!allowed) {
- delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token];
- }
+ s_tokenDepositAllowed[token] = allowed;
+ // Keep s_tokenToAssetToken intact — existing depositors must still withdraw
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge 3 days ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[M-01] 'ThunderLoan::setAllowedToken' can permanently lock liquidity providers out from redeeming their tokens

## Description If the 'ThunderLoan::setAllowedToken' function is called with the intention of setting an allowed token to false and thus deleting the assetToken to token mapping; nobody would be able to redeem funds of that token in the 'ThunderLoan::redeem' function and thus have them locked away without access. ## Vulnerability Details If the owner sets an allowed token to false, this deletes the mapping of the asset token to that ERC20. If this is done, and a liquidity provider has already deposited ERC20 tokens of that type, then the liquidity provider will not be able to redeem them in the 'ThunderLoan::redeem' function. ```solidity function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) { if (allowed) { if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) { revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed(); } string memory name = string.concat("ThunderLoan ", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).name()); string memory symbol = string.concat("tl", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).symbol()); AssetToken assetToken = new AssetToken(address(this), token, name, symbol); s_tokenToAssetToken[token] = assetToken; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } else { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; @> delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } } ``` ```solidity function redeem( IERC20 token, uint256 amountOfAssetToken ) external revertIfZero(amountOfAssetToken) @> revertIfNotAllowedToken(token) { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; uint256 exchangeRate = assetToken.getExchangeRate(); if (amountOfAssetToken == type(uint256).max) { amountOfAssetToken = assetToken.balanceOf(msg.sender); } uint256 amountUnderlying = (amountOfAssetToken * exchangeRate) / assetToken.EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION(); emit Redeemed(msg.sender, token, amountOfAssetToken, amountUnderlying); assetToken.burn(msg.sender, amountOfAssetToken); assetToken.transferUnderlyingTo(msg.sender, amountUnderlying); } ``` ## Impact The below test passes with a ThunderLoan\_\_NotAllowedToken error. Proving that a liquidity provider cannot redeem their deposited tokens if the setAllowedToken is set to false, Locking them out of their tokens. ```solidity function testCannotRedeemNonAllowedTokenAfterDepositingToken() public { vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner()); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, true); tokenA.mint(liquidityProvider, AMOUNT); vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); tokenA.approve(address(thunderLoan), AMOUNT); thunderLoan.deposit(tokenA, AMOUNT); vm.stopPrank(); vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner()); thunderLoan.setAllowedToken(tokenA, false); vm.expectRevert(abi.encodeWithSelector(ThunderLoan.ThunderLoan__NotAllowedToken.selector, address(tokenA))); vm.startPrank(liquidityProvider); thunderLoan.redeem(tokenA, AMOUNT_LESS); vm.stopPrank(); } ``` ## Recommendations It would be suggested to add a check if that assetToken holds any balance of the ERC20, if so, then you cannot remove the mapping. ```diff function setAllowedToken(IERC20 token, bool allowed) external onlyOwner returns (AssetToken) { if (allowed) { if (address(s_tokenToAssetToken[token]) != address(0)) { revert ThunderLoan__AlreadyAllowed(); } string memory name = string.concat("ThunderLoan ", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).name()); string memory symbol = string.concat("tl", IERC20Metadata(address(token)).symbol()); AssetToken assetToken = new AssetToken(address(this), token, name, symbol); s_tokenToAssetToken[token] = assetToken; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); return assetToken; } else { AssetToken assetToken = s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; + uint256 hasTokenBalance = IERC20(token).balanceOf(address(assetToken)); + if (hasTokenBalance == 0) { delete s_tokenToAssetToken[token]; emit AllowedTokenSet(token, assetToken, allowed); + } return assetToken; } } ```

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