Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage collision during upgrade: `ThunderLoanUpgraded` reorders `s_feePrecision`/`s_flashLoanFee`, corrupting fee state

Description

ThunderLoan is a UUPS upgradeable contract. The storage layout of the upgraded implementation must match the original, but ThunderLoanUpgraded changes it. The original declares two storage slots in this order:

// ThunderLoan.sol
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot N
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+1

The upgrade removes s_feePrecision (making it a constant, which occupies NO storage) and keeps s_flashLoanFee first:

// ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // @> now occupies slot N (previously s_feePrecision)
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // @> constant, no storage slot

After the upgrade, the slot that stored s_feePrecision (value 1e18) is now read as s_flashLoanFee, and the slot that stored s_flashLoanFee (value 3e15) is now read as the s_currentlyFlashLoaning mapping base. The persisted storage does not move during an upgrade, so the variables are silently mis-aligned.

Risk

Likelihood: High

  • This is deterministic: any upgrade from ThunderLoan to ThunderLoanUpgraded triggers it immediately, with no attacker action required.

Impact: High

  • s_flashLoanFee reads the old s_feePrecision value (1e18) instead of 3e15, so the flash-loan fee becomes astronomically wrong (effectively charging ~100% of the borrowed value, or otherwise corrupting getCalculatedFee). Core fee accounting is broken after upgrade, breaking flash loans and the exchange-rate updates that depend on the fee.

Proof of Concept

// Before upgrade: slot1 = s_feePrecision = 1e18, slot2 = s_flashLoanFee = 3e15
// Upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded (s_feePrecision is now a constant):
// slot1 is now interpreted as s_flashLoanFee => s_flashLoanFee == 1e18 (was meant to be 3e15)
// getCalculatedFee uses the corrupted s_flashLoanFee -> wildly incorrect fees.

Recommended Mitigation

Preserve the exact storage layout across upgrades — keep the same variables in the same order (do not convert a storage variable to a constant, and do not reorder):

// keep both slots, in the original order:
uint256 private s_feePrecision;
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
// use storage gaps / a documented layout and verify with storage-layout diff tooling.
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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