Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage collision on upgrade: ThunderLoanUpgraded reads fee as 100%

Root + Impact

Description

V1 declares uint256 private s_feePrecision; (slot 1, = 1e18) then uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; (slot 2, = 3e15). V2 deletes s_feePrecision and declares uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; directly after the mapping — i.e. at slot 1. FEE_PRECISION is a constant (no slot). After a UUPS upgrade, s_flashLoanFee reads the stale slot-1 value 1e18: every flash loan charges a 100% fee and updateExchangeRate doubles the rate per loan. Core function bricked.

Vulnerability Details: Confirmed by reading both contracts' state-variable order; no dynamic types involved, plain slot shift. getCalculatedFee → fee = valueOfBorrowedToken * 1e18 / 1e18 = 100% of borrowed value. flashloan then requires endingBalance >= startingBalance + amount (2x repayment) and doubles the exchange rate each loan.

Risk

  • A single owner-authorized upgrade triggers the collision — the storage layout shift is deterministic and unavoidable once the new implementation is adopted.

  • Likelihood: Medium — requires an owner-authorized upgrade to the new implementation.

  • Impact: High — a single owner-authorized upgrade bricks flash loans (repayment requires 200%); exchange-rate accounting explodes. PoC (VERIFIED, test/PoC.t.sol::testPoC_StorageCollisionOnUpgrade): Deploy ERC1967Proxy → V1 → initialize → upgradeToAndCall(V2): getFee() returns 3e15 before, 1e18 after — the 100% fee is live on-chain state post-upgrade.

Proof of Concept

function testPoC_StorageCollisionOnUpgrade() public {
uint256 feeBefore = thunderLoan.getFee();
assertEq(feeBefore, 3e15, "sanity: V1 fee is 0.3%");
ThunderLoanUpgraded v2 = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner());
thunderLoan.upgradeToAndCall(address(v2), "");
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy));
uint256 feeAfter = upgraded.getFee();
assertEq(feeAfter, 1e18, "H-3: fee should read 1e18 (100%) after upgrade");
}

Recommended Mitigation

Never remove/reorder storage variables in upgrades; append new variables after a __gap, or keep s_feePrecision in place.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 4 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!