Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

ThunderLoanUpgraded removes s_feePrecision and shifts storage, so after the upgrade the flash loan fee becomes 100 percent

Root + Impact

Description

  • ThunderLoan is deployed behind a UUPS proxy, so the storage of the proxy keeps its layout after an upgrade. ThunderLoan stores `s_feePrecision` first and `s_flashLoanFee` second.

  • ThunderLoanUpgraded replaces `s_feePrecision` with a constant, which removes a storage slot, so `s_flashLoanFee` now reads the slot that still holds the old `s_feePrecision` value of 1e18 and the `s_currentlyFlashLoaning` mapping moves by one slot too. The README says this exact upgrade is planned.

// ThunderLoan.sol (current implementation), storage layout
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot A
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot B, 3e15 = 0.3%
mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // slot C
​
// ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol (planned upgrade)
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // now in slot A, which still holds the old s_feePrecision = 1e18
@> uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
mapping(IERC20 => bool) private s_currentlyFlashLoaning; // now in slot B// Root cause in the codebase with @> marks to highlight the relevant section

Risk

Likelihood:

  • The upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded is planned, and the wrong values appear in the same transaction as the upgrade, no attacker is needed.

  • The problem is permanent until the owner notices and resets the fee.

Impact:

  • After the upgrade the flash loan fee is 100 percent of the borrowed value (1e18) instead of 0.3 percent, so flash loans become unusable or extremely expensive and the fee income of liquidity providers is distorted.

  • The shifted `s_currentlyFlashLoaning` mapping corrupts the state used to guard repayment.

Proof of Concept

The test deploys ThunderLoan behind a proxy and reads the fee, which is 3e15 (0.3 percent). The owner then upgrades the proxy to ThunderLoanUpgraded, as the README says is planned. Reading the fee again returns 1e18 (100 percent), because ThunderLoanUpgraded no longer has the s_feePrecision variable in storage, so every following variable reads the slot of its predecessor.

function test_R3_upgradeStorageCollisionBreaksFee() public {
assertEq(thunderLoan.getFee(), 3e15); // 0.3 percent before the upgrade
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded)); // UUPS upgrade by the owner
assertEq(ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(thunderLoan)).getFee(), 1e18); // 100 percent after the upgrade
}

Recommended Mitigation

Keep the storage layout of the old implementation when upgrading. Leave a placeholder variable where s_feePrecision used to be (or keep the variable) and only keep FEE_PRECISION as a constant, which takes no storage slot.

// ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol
- uint256 private s_feePrecision;
+ uint256 private s_blank; // keeps the storage slot of the removed s_feePrecision
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee;
+ uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // constants take no storage slot- remove this code
+ add this code
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 2 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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