Normal behavior: ThunderLoan is UUPS-upgradeable. Upgrading to ThunderLoanUpgraded must preserve the existing storage layout so persisted state (the flash-loan fee) keeps its meaning.
Issue: ThunderLoanUpgraded removes s_feePrecision (turning it into constant FEE_PRECISION) and moves s_flashLoanFee into the slot s_feePrecision used to occupy. Because initialize() has the initializer modifier and cannot run again on upgrade, the old storage is reinterpreted: after the upgrade s_flashLoanFee reads the value previously held by s_feePrecision (1e18) instead of 3e15.
solidity
// ThunderLoan.sol (original)
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) private s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot N
@> uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot N+1 == 1e18
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+2 == 3e15
// ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol (new) — same proxy storage
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) private s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot N
@> uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+1 -> now reads old s_feePrecision (1e18)!
@> uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // constant: occupies NO storage slot
Likelihood: High
Happens deterministically on any upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded.
initialize() cannot re-set s_flashLoanFee (the initializer modifier blocks re-initialization), so the collided value persists.
Impact: High
After upgrade s_flashLoanFee == 1e18. getCalculatedFee computes fee = valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee / FEE_PRECISION = valueOfBorrowedToken * 1e18 / 1e18, i.e. the fee becomes ~100% of the borrowed value instead of 0.3%.
Flash loans become economically unusable and all fee accounting is corrupted — a protocol-breaking state introduced by the upgrade.
ThunderLoanUpgraded.initialize() carries the initializer modifier, so it cannot run during an upgrade — the collided slot is never re-set. The test deploys ThunderLoan, reads the fee (3e15), upgrades the proxy, and reads the fee again: it now returns 1e18 (the old s_feePrecision), proving the collision.
Run forge test --match-contract PoC_StorageCollision -vv:
solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity 0.8.20;
import { BaseTest, ThunderLoan } from "./BaseTest.t.sol";
import { ThunderLoanUpgraded } from "../../src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol";
import { console } from "forge-std/Test.sol";
contract PoC_StorageCollision is BaseTest {
function test_StorageCollisionBreaksFeeAfterUpgrade() public {
uint256 feeBefore = thunderLoan.getFee(); // 3e15 (0.3%)
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(upgraded)); // owner == address(this)
uint256 feeAfter = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(thunderLoan)).getFee();
console.log("fee before upgrade:", feeBefore);
console.log("fee after upgrade :", feeAfter);
assertEq(feeBefore, 3e15);
assertEq(feeAfter, 1e18); // reads the OLD s_feePrecision -> collision proven
}
}
Output:
fee before upgrade: 3000000000000000
fee after upgrade : 1000000000000000000
Storage layout must be append-only across upgrades: never remove or reorder existing state variables, and never replace a storage variable with a constant/immutable (that frees its slot and shifts everything after it). Keep the original slot occupied:
diff
contract ThunderLoanUpgraded is Initializable, OwnableUpgradeable, UUPSUpgradeable, OracleUpgradeable {
mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) private s_tokenToAssetToken;
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // KEEP this slot to preserve layout
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // stays in its original slot (reads 3e15, not 1e18)
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18;
}
Long-term: add a storage gap (uint256[50] private __gap;) and validate layouts between versions (forge inspect <Contract> storage-layout, or OpenZeppelin upgrade-safety checks).
## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan
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