Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Storage layout collision between `ThunderLoan` and `ThunderLoanUpgraded` corrupts `s_flashLoanFee` after upgrade

Description

ThunderLoan is a UUPS upgradeable contract, and the README puts the upgrade to
ThunderLoanUpgraded in scope. In a proxy, storage is kept by slot position, not by
variable name: the upgraded implementation must preserve the exact storage layout of the
old one, or existing values end up read through the wrong variables.

The two versions declare their storage differently:

ThunderLoan (current):

mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot N
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // slot N+1 (= 1e18)
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+2 (= 3e15)

ThunderLoanUpgraded:

mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken; // slot N
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // slot N+1 <-- moved up
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // constant -> occupies NO storage slot

Because FEE_PRECISION is now a constant (constants are not stored), s_flashLoanFee
shifts up into slot N+1 — the slot that previously held s_feePrecision. The proxy
still has the old value 1e18 sitting in that slot. After the upgrade, every read of
s_flashLoanFee returns 1e18 instead of the intended 3e15.

Since the fee is computed as fee = valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee / FEE_PRECISION
= valueOfBorrowedToken * 1e18 / 1e18, the flash-loan fee jumps from 0.3% to effectively
100% of the borrowed value, breaking the protocol's economics.

Risk

Likelihood: High — this is deterministic. It happens automatically the moment the
planned, in-scope upgrade is performed; no attacker is required.

Impact: High — the flash-loan fee is corrupted (0.3% -> 100%), making flash loans
unusable and massively overcharging users. The protocol's core accounting is broken after
the upgrade.

Proof of Concept

Deploy, read the fee (3e15), upgrade to ThunderLoanUpgraded, read the fee again — it is
now 1e18 (the stale s_feePrecision value):

function test_upgradeCorruptsFee() public {
uint256 feeBefore = thunderLoan.getFee(); // 3e15
​
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded();
vm.prank(thunderLoan.owner());
thunderLoan.upgradeToAndCall(address(upgraded), "");
​
uint256 feeAfter = thunderLoan.getFee(); // 1e18 (corrupted)
​
assert(feeBefore != feeAfter);
assertEq(feeAfter, 1e18);
}

The test passes: feeBefore = 3e15, feeAfter = 1e18.

Recommended Mitigation

Preserve the exact storage layout across the upgrade. Do not remove or reorder storage
variables; if a variable must be retired, leave its slot in place (e.g. keep it as a
private placeholder / storage gap) so later variables keep their original slots:

mapping(IERC20 => AssetToken) public s_tokenToAssetToken;
uint256 private s_feePrecision; // keep this slot occupied (do NOT turn it into a constant)
uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // stays in its original slot N+2

Review upgrades with a storage-layout diff tool (e.g. forge inspect <C> storageLayout
or OpenZeppelin Upgrades) before deploying.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 3 hours ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

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