Thunder Loan

AI First Flight #7
Beginner FriendlyFoundryDeFiOracle
EXP
View results
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Upgrade to `ThunderLoanUpgraded` shifts the storage layout so `s_flashLoanFee` reads the old `s_feePrecision` slot (1e18) — every flash loan is charged a 100% fee and the protocol breaks on upgrade

Summary

ThunderLoan declares s_feePrecision (slot 203) before s_flashLoanFee (slot 204). ThunderLoanUpgraded replaces s_feePrecision with a constant FEE_PRECISION — which occupies no storage slot — and declares s_flashLoanFee one position earlier, so after a UUPS upgrade s_flashLoanFee reads slot 203, the old s_feePrecision value 1e18. The fee formula degenerates to fee = valueOfBorrowedToken * 1e18 / 1e18 = the full borrowed value: a 100% flash-loan fee. The upgraded initialize() cannot repair this because it is guarded by initializer and the proxy was already initialized under v1; no reinitializer exists. The README explicitly puts this planned upgrade in scope.

Vulnerability Details

Storage layouts (verified with forge inspect … storage-layout):

ThunderLoan (v1) ThunderLoanUpgraded
slot 202 s_tokenToAssetToken slot 202 s_tokenToAssetToken
slot 203 s_feePrecision = 1e18 slot 203 s_flashLoanFee -> reads 1e18
slot 204 s_flashLoanFee = 3e15 slot 204 s_currentlyFlashLoaning
slot 205 s_currentlyFlashLoaning (FEE_PRECISION is a constant, no slot)

In src/upgradedProtocol/ThunderLoanUpgraded.sol:

uint256 private s_flashLoanFee; // 0.3% ETH fee // line 96 — one slot earlier than v1
uint256 public constant FEE_PRECISION = 1e18; // line 97 — constants use no slot
...
function getCalculatedFee(IERC20 token, uint256 amount) public view returns (uint256 fee) {
uint256 valueOfBorrowedToken = (amount * getPriceInWeth(address(token))) / FEE_PRECISION;
fee = (valueOfBorrowedToken * s_flashLoanFee) / FEE_PRECISION; // = valueOfBorrowedToken
}

Impact

The moment the planned upgrade executes, flash loans are bricked: an honest borrower repaying principal + the documented 0.3% fee reverts with ThunderLoan__NotPaidBack (PoC: expected 200e18, repaid 100.3e18). Anyone who does repay the 100% fee donates a second principal to the pool. Additionally, flashloan() calls updateExchangeRate(fee) before lending, so a single post-upgrade loan inflates the AssetToken exchange rate by roughly the full loan amount, corrupting LP accounting in a way that does not heal when the owner later fixes the fee (the exchange rate can only increase). The owner can repair the fee afterwards with updateFlashLoanFee(3e15), but the upgrade as shipped is silently broken from the first block, with no warning — getFee() happily returns 1e18.

Proof of Concept

Foundry test (passes locally):

function test_upgradeCorruptsFlashLoanFee() public {
assertEq(thunderLoan.getFee(), 3e15);
assertEq(thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, LP_DEPOSIT), 3e17); // 0.3% of 100
​
thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(new ThunderLoanUpgraded()));
ThunderLoanUpgraded upgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy));
​
assertEq(upgraded.getFee(), 1e18); // corrupted
assertEq(upgraded.getCalculatedFee(tokenA, LP_DEPOSIT), LP_DEPOSIT); // 100% fee
​
// Honest borrower repaying principal + documented 0.3% fee now fails:
HonestReceiver receiver = new HonestReceiver(address(thunderLoan)); // repays amount + amount*3e15/1e18 via repay()
tokenA.mint(address(receiver), 1e18);
vm.expectRevert(
abi.encodeWithSignature("ThunderLoan__NotPaidBack(uint256,uint256)", 200e18, 100.3e18)
);
upgraded.flashloan(address(receiver), tokenA, LP_DEPOSIT, "");
}

Recommended Mitigation

Keep the storage layout append-only across upgrades: retain a uint256 private s_feePrecision; placeholder variable in ThunderLoanUpgraded in the same position as v1 (even if unused), or reorder the upgraded declarations to match v1's slots exactly. Add a storage-layout check (e.g. forge inspect diff or OpenZeppelin upgrades validations) to the upgrade pipeline, and consider a reinitializer(2) migration that re-sets s_flashLoanFee = 3e15 atomically via upgradeToAndCall.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

ai-first-flight-judge Lead Judge about 1 hour ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

[H-01] Storage Collision during upgrade

## Description The thunderloanupgrade.sol storage layout is not compatible with the storage layout of thunderloan.sol which will cause storage collision and mismatch of variable to different data. ## Vulnerability Details Thunderloan.sol at slot 1,2 and 3 holds s_feePrecision, s_flashLoanFee and s_currentlyFlashLoaning, respectively, but the ThunderLoanUpgraded at slot 1 and 2 holds s_flashLoanFee, s_currentlyFlashLoaning respectively. the s_feePrecision from the thunderloan.sol was changed to a constant variable which will no longer be assessed from the state variable. This will cause the location at which the upgraded version will be pointing to for some significant state variables like s_flashLoanFee to be wrong because s_flashLoanFee is now pointing to the slot of the s_feePrecision in the thunderloan.sol and when this fee is used to compute the fee for flashloan it will return a fee amount greater than the intention of the developer. s_currentlyFlashLoaning might not really be affected as it is back to default when a flashloan is completed but still to be noted that the value at that slot can be cleared to be on a safer side. ## Impact 1. Fee is miscalculated for flashloan 1. users pay same amount of what they borrowed as fee ## POC 2 ``` function testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken hasDeposits { //upgrade thunderloan upgradeThunderloan(); uint256 amountToBorrow = AMOUNT * 10; console.log("amount flashloaned", amountToBorrow); uint256 calculatedFee = thunderLoan.getCalculatedFee( tokenA, amountToBorrow ); AssetToken assetToken = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); vm.startPrank(user); tokenA.mint(address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), amountToBorrow); thunderLoan.flashloan( address(mockFlashLoanReceiver), tokenA, amountToBorrow, "" ); vm.stopPrank(); console.log("feepaid", calculatedFee); assertEq(amountToBorrow, calculatedFee); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run `forge test --mt testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade -vv` to test for the second poc ## Recommendations The team should should make sure the the fee is pointing to the correct location as intended by the developer: a suggestion recommendation is for the team to get the feeValue from the previous implementation, clear the values that will not be needed again and after upgrade reset the fee back to its previous value from the implementation. ##POC for recommendation ``` // function upgradeThunderloanFixed() internal { thunderLoanUpgraded = new ThunderLoanUpgraded(); //getting the current fee; uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); // clear the fee as thunderLoan.updateFlashLoanFee(0); // upgrade to the new implementation thunderLoan.upgradeTo(address(thunderLoanUpgraded)); //wrapped the abi thunderLoanUpgraded = ThunderLoanUpgraded(address(proxy)); // set the fee back to the correct value thunderLoanUpgraded.updateFlashLoanFee(fee); } function testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade() public setAllowedToken { AssetToken asset = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint precision = thunderLoan.getFeePrecision(); uint fee = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaning = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning(tokenA); /// 4 slots before upgrade console.log("????SLOTS VALUE BEFORE UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(asset)); console.log("slot 1 for s_feePrecision =>", precision); console.log("slot 2 for s_flashLoanFee =>", fee); console.log("slot 3 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaning); //upgrade function upgradeThunderloanFixed(); //// after upgrade they are only 3 valid slot left because precision is now set to constant AssetToken assetUpgrade = thunderLoan.getAssetFromToken(tokenA); uint feeUpgrade = thunderLoan.getFee(); bool isflanshloaningUpgrade = thunderLoan.isCurrentlyFlashLoaning( tokenA ); console.log("????SLOTS VALUE After UPGRADE????"); console.log("slot 0 for s_tokenToAssetToken =>", address(assetUpgrade)); console.log("slot 1 for s_flashLoanFee =>", feeUpgrade); console.log( "slot 2 for s_currentlyFlashLoaning =>", isflanshloaningUpgrade ); assertEq(address(asset), address(assetUpgrade)); //asserting precision value before upgrade to be what fee takes after upgrades assertEq(fee, feeUpgrade); // #POC assertEq(isflanshloaning, isflanshloaningUpgrade); } ``` Add the code above to thunderloantest.t.sol and run with `forge test --mt testSlotValuesFixedfterUpgrade -vv`. it can also be tested with `testFlashLoanAfterUpgrade function` and see the fee properly calculated for flashloan

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.

Give us feedback!