Submission Details
Severity:
`Price` might be less than final audit price when buyer sends more token to escrow to increase reward.
Summary
In the current implementation price is never changed once set.
In case buyer sent more token to increase escrow pot size, then price should be updated to contract's token balance so that price would be final price not initial price.
Vulnerability Details
function confirmReceipt() external onlyBuyer inState(State.Created) {
s_state = State.Confirmed;
emit Confirmed(i_seller);
i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_seller, i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this))); //@audit - should be price
}
function resolveDispute(uint256 buyerAward) external onlyArbiter nonReentrant inState(State.Disputed) {
uint256 tokenBalance = i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 totalFee = buyerAward + i_arbiterFee; // Reverts on overflow
if (totalFee > tokenBalance) {
revert Escrow__TotalFeeExceedsBalance(tokenBalance, totalFee);
}
s_state = State.Resolved;
emit Resolved(i_buyer, i_seller);
if (buyerAward > 0) {
i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_buyer, buyerAward);
}
if (i_arbiterFee > 0) {
i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_arbiter, i_arbiterFee);
}
tokenBalance = i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this)); //@audit - price - totalFee
if (tokenBalance > 0) {
i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_seller, tokenBalance);
}
Impact
Price might not less than final price of audit.
Tools Used
Manual Review
Recommendations
As there's no way to hook transfer event, price should be updated to balanceOf(address(this)) at confirmReceipt(), and resolveDispute()
- uint256 private immutable i_price;
+ uint256 private i_price;
function confirmReceipt() external onlyBuyer inState(State.Created) {
s_state = State.Confirmed;
emit Confirmed(i_seller);
- i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_seller, i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this)));
+ price = i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this));
+ i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_seller, price); //@audit - should be price
}
function resolveDispute(uint256 buyerAward) external onlyArbiter nonReentrant inState(State.Disputed) {
uint256 tokenBalance = i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this));
uint256 totalFee = buyerAward + i_arbiterFee; // Reverts on overflow
if (totalFee > tokenBalance) {
revert Escrow__TotalFeeExceedsBalance(tokenBalance, totalFee);
}
s_state = State.Resolved;
emit Resolved(i_buyer, i_seller);
if (buyerAward > 0) {
i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_buyer, buyerAward);
}
if (i_arbiterFee > 0) {
i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_arbiter, i_arbiterFee);
}
- tokenBalance = i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this)); //@audit - price - totalFee
+ price = i_tokenContract.balanceOf(address(this));
+ tokenBalance = price - totalFee;
if (tokenBalance > 0) {
i_tokenContract.safeTransfer(i_seller, tokenBalance);
}
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
40,000 USDC
nSLOC
186215 USDC / LOC
37,000 USDC
3,000 USDC
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