Submission Details
Severity:
No check if Arbitrum L2 sequencer is down in OracleLib
Summary
Using Chainlink in L2 chains such as Arbitrum requires to check if the sequencer is down to avoid prices from looking like they are fresh although they are not.
The bug could be leveraged by malicious actors to take advantage of the sequencer downtime.
Vulnerability Details
The OracleLib is used the get the the price of collateral. There is no check that the sequencer is down:
function staleCheckLatestRoundData(AggregatorV3Interface priceFeed)
public
view
returns (uint80, int256, uint256, uint256, uint80)
{
(uint80 roundId, int256 answer, uint256 startedAt, uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) =
priceFeed.latestRoundData();
uint256 secondsSince = block.timestamp - updatedAt;
if (secondsSince > TIMEOUT) revert OracleLib__StalePrice();
return (roundId, answer, startedAt, updatedAt, answeredInRound);
}
Impact
could potentially be exploited by malicious actors to gain an unfair advantage.
Tools Used
Manual Review
Recommendations
Code example of Chainlink:
https://docs.chain.link/data-feeds/l2-sequencer-feeds#example-code
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
15,000 USDC
nSLOC
23664 USDC / LOC
14,000 USDC
1,000 USDC
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