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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

OracleLib will return the wrong price for asset if underlying aggregator hits minAnswer

Summary

Chainlink aggregators have a built in circuit breaker if the price of an asset goes outside of a predetermined price band. The result is that if an asset experiences a huge drop in value (i.e. LUNA crash) the price of the oracle will continue to return the minPrice instead of the actual price of the asset. This would allow user to continue borrowing with the asset but at the wrong price. This is exactly what happened to Venus on BSC when LUNA imploded.

Vulnerability Details

OracleLib utilize the ChainlinkFeedRegistry to fetch the price of the requested tokens.

function staleCheckLatestRoundData(AggregatorV3Interface priceFeed)
public
view
returns (uint80, int256, uint256, uint256, uint80)
{
(uint80 roundId, int256 answer, uint256 startedAt, uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) =
priceFeed.latestRoundData();
uint256 secondsSince = block.timestamp - updatedAt;
if (secondsSince > TIMEOUT) revert OracleLib__StalePrice();
return (roundId, answer, startedAt, updatedAt, answeredInRound);
}

ChainlinkFeedRegistry#latestRoundData extracts the linked aggregator and requests round data from it. If an asset's price falls below the minPrice, the protocol continues to value the token at the minPrice rather than its real value. This discrepancy could have the protocol end up minting drastically larger amount of Dsc as well as returning a much bigger collateral factor.

For instance, if TokenA's minPrice is $1 and its price falls to $0.10, the aggregator continues to report $1, rendering the related function calls to entail a value that is ten times the actual value.

It's important to note that while Chainlink oracles form part of the OracleAggregator system and the use of a combination of oracles could potentially prevent such a situation, there's still a risk. Secondary oracles, such as Band, could potentially be exploited by a malicious user who can DDOS relayers to prevent price updates. Once the price becomes stale, the Chainlink oracle's price would be the sole reference, posing a significant risk.

Impact

In the event of an asset crash (like LUNA), the protocol can be manipulated to handle calls at an inflated price.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

OracleLib should cross-check the returned answer against the minPrice/maxPrice and revert if the answer is outside of these bounds:

(, int256 price, , uint256 updatedAt, ) = oracle.latestRoundData();
if (price >= maxPrice or price <= minPrice) revert();

This ensures that a false price will not be returned if the underlying asset's value hits the minPrice.
Also minAnswer and maxAnswer should be stored individually for every oracle

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