DittoETH

Ditto
DeFiFoundryOracle
55,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Invalid

latestRoundData() has no check for round completeness

Summary

No check for round completeness could lead to stale prices and wrong price return value, or outdated price. The functions rely on accurate price feed might not work as expected, sometimes can lead to fund loss. Also notice the wrong logic in code,

Vulnerability Details

The oracle wrapper getOraclePrice() call out to an oracle with latestRoundData() to get the price of some token. Although the returned timestamp is checked, there is no check for round completeness.

According to Chainlink's documentation, this function does not error if no answer has been reached but returns 0 or outdated round data. The external Chainlink oracle, which provides index price information to the system, introduces risk inherent to any dependency on third-party data sources. For example, the oracle could fall behind or otherwise fail to be maintained, resulting in outdated data being fed to the index price calculations. Oracle reliance has historically resulted in crippled on-chain systems, and complications that lead to these outcomes can arise from things as simple as network congestion.

Impact

If there is a problem with chainlink starting a new round and finding consensus on the new value for the oracle (e.g. chainlink nodes abandon the oracle, chain congestion, vulnerability/attacks on the chainlink system) consumers of this contract may continue using outdated stale data (if oracles are unable to submit no new round is started).

This could lead to stale prices and wrong price return value, or outdated price.

As a result, the functions rely on accurate price feed might not work as expected, sometimes can lead to fund loss. The impacts vary and depends on the specific situation like the following:

incorrect liquidation
some users could be liquidated when they should not
no liquidation is performed when there should be
wrong price feed
causing inappropriate loan being taken, beyond the current collateral factor
too low price feed affect normal bor

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Validate data feed for round completeness:

function getOraclePrice(address asset) internal view returns (uint256) {
AppStorage storage s = appStorage();
AggregatorV3Interface baseOracle = AggregatorV3Interface(s.baseOracle);
uint256 protocolPrice = getPrice(asset);
// prettier-ignore
(
uint80 baseRoundID,
int256 basePrice,
/*uint256 baseStartedAt*/
,
uint256 baseTimeStamp,
uint80 baseAnsweredInRound // uncomment this code
) = baseOracle.latestRoundData();

Include the code example:

error roundIncomplete(uin80 baseAnsweredInRound, uint80 baseRoundID);
if (baseAnsweredInRound < baseRoundID) {
revert roundIncomplete(baseAnsweredInRound, baseRoundID);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge
over 1 year ago
0xnevi Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Other

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