The current implementation of Stake.link protocol
uses Ethereum addresses (address type)
to represent destinations for Cross-Chain Interoperability Protocol (CCIP) messages. This limits the protocol's compatibility with non-Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) chains such as Polkadot or Tron, potentially hindering interoperability.
The identified vulnerability lies in the following code snippet:
The vulnerability stems from using Ethereum addresses for _destination
, limiting the protocol's ability to support non-EVM addresses. Furthermore whitelistedDestinations
mapping stores whitelisted addresses as address type
.
The current implementation restricts the Stake.link protocol from seamlessly interacting with chains that employ address standards different from Ethereum's . This limitation impedes the protocol's goal of providing cross-chain functionality.
Manual Analysis
Adopt Flexible Address Handling that includes using string
instead of address
for destinations
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.