The Standard

Summary

Call to the Chainlink latestRoundData function could potentially revert and make it impossible to query any prices. Feeds cannot be changed after they are configured. so this would result in a permanent DoS.

Vulnerability Details

Chainlink’s multisigs can immediately block access to price feeds at will. Therefore, to prevent DoS scenarios, it is recommended to query Chainlink price feeds using a defensive approach with Solidity’s try/catch structure.
In this way, if the call to the price feed fails, the caller contract is still in control and can handle any errors safely and explicitly.

Impact

Unhandled chainlink revert would lock all price oracle access thereby preventing all forms of borrowing, debt position repayment and querrying of SmartVault status.

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

Surround the call to latestRoundData() with try/catch instead of calling it directly. In a scenario where the call reverts, the catch block can be used to call a fallback oracle or handle the error in any other suitable way.