When utilizing Chainlink in L2 chains like Arbitrum, it's important to ensure that the prices provided are not falsely perceived as fresh, even when the sequencer is down. This vulnerability could potentially be exploited by malicious actors to gain an unfair advantage.
function distributeAssets(
ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset[] memory _assets,
uint256 _collateralRate,
uint256 _hundredPC
) external payable {
consolidatePendingStakes();
(, int256 priceEurUsd, , , ) = Chainlink
.AggregatorV3Interface(eurUsd)
.latestRoundData();
uint256 stakeTotal = getStakeTotal();
uint256 burnEuros;
uint256 nativePurchased;
for (uint256 j = 0; j < holders.length; j++) {
Position memory _position = positions[holders[j]];
uint256 _positionStake = stake(_position);
if (_positionStake > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _assets.length; i++) {
ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset memory asset = _assets[i];
if (asset.amount > 0) {
(, int256 assetPriceUsd, , , ) = Chainlink
.AggregatorV3Interface(asset.token.clAddr)
.latestRoundData();
uint256 _portion = (asset.amount * _positionStake) /
stakeTotal;
uint256 costInEuros = (((_portion *
10 ** (18 - asset.token.dec) *
uint256(assetPriceUsd)) / uint256(priceEurUsd)) *
_hundredPC) / _collateralRate;
if (costInEuros > _position.EUROs) {
_portion =
(_portion * _position.EUROs) /
costInEuros;
costInEuros = _position.EUROs;
}
_position.EUROs -= costInEuros;
rewards[
abi.encodePacked(
_position.holder,
asset.token.symbol
)
] += _portion;
burnEuros += costInEuros;
if (asset.token.addr == address(0)) {
nativePurchased += _portion;
} else {
IERC20(asset.token.addr).safeTransferFrom(
manager,
address(this),
_portion
);
}
}
}
}
positions[holders[j]] = _position;
}
if (burnEuros > 0) IEUROs(EUROs).burn(address(this), burnEuros);
returnUnpurchasedNative(_assets, nativePurchased);
}
could potentially be exploited by malicious actors to gain an unfair advantage.