Summary
The loops in the distributeAssets() and distributeFees() functions have no bounds on the array, which could lead to an overall "out of gas" scenario.
Vulnerability Details
In the LiquidationPool.increasePosition()
function, the protocol adds each liquidity provider to the holders array.
function addUniqueHolder(address _holder) private {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < holders.length; i++) {
if (holders[i] == _holder) return;
}
holders.push(_holder);
}
Subsequently, in both distributeAssets() and distributeFees(), there are loops based on the length of holders.length.
function distributeFees(uint256 _amount) external onlyManager {
uint256 tstTotal = getTstTotal();
if (tstTotal > 0) {
IERC20(EUROs).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _amount);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < holders.length; i++) {
address _holder = holders[i];
positions[_holder].EUROs += _amount * positions[_holder].TST / tstTotal;
}
for (uint256 i = 0; i < pendingStakes.length; i++) {
pendingStakes[i].EUROs += _amount * pendingStakes[i].TST / tstTotal;
}
}
}
function distributeAssets(ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset[] memory _assets, uint256 _collateralRate, uint256 _hundredPC) external payable {
consolidatePendingStakes();
(,int256 priceEurUsd,,,) = Chainlink.AggregatorV3Interface(eurUsd).latestRoundData();
uint256 stakeTotal = getStakeTotal();
uint256 burnEuros;
uint256 nativePurchased;
for (uint256 j = 0; j < holders.length; j++) {
Position memory _position = positions[holders[j]];
uint256 _positionStake = stake(_position);
if (_positionStake > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _assets.length; i++) {
ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset memory asset = _assets[i];
if (asset.amount > 0) {
If a malicious user calls increasePosition()
to add a substantial amount of dust positions or if there are many legitimate users, the value of holders.length
can become large, leading to out-of-gas issues during the execution of distributeAssets()
and distributeFees()
.
Impact
Due to an "out of gas" condition, the execution will fail.
Tools Used
Vscode
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