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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Invalid

`distributeAssets()` would not function well with `PAXG` due to it's implemented fee on transfer mechanism

bauchibred

Proof of Concept

Firstly, would be key to note that some ERC20 tokens implemented so a fee is taken when transferring them, for example STA and PAXG.

Now take a look at LiquidationPool.sol#L205-L241

function distributeAssets(ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset[] memory _assets, uint256 _collateralRate, uint256 _hundredPC) external payable {
consolidatePendingStakes();
(,int256 priceEurUsd,,,) = Chainlink.AggregatorV3Interface(eurUsd).latestRoundData();
uint256 stakeTotal = getStakeTotal();
uint256 burnEuros;
uint256 nativePurchased;
for (uint256 j = 0; j < holders.length; j++) {
Position memory _position = positions[holders[j]];
uint256 _positionStake = stake(_position);
if (_positionStake > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _assets.length; i++) {
ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset memory asset = _assets[i];
if (asset.amount > 0) {
(,int256 assetPriceUsd,,,) = Chainlink.AggregatorV3Interface(asset.token.clAddr).latestRoundData();
uint256 _portion = asset.amount * _positionStake / stakeTotal;
uint256 costInEuros = _portion * 10 ** (18 - asset.token.dec) * uint256(assetPriceUsd) / uint256(priceEurUsd)
* _hundredPC / _collateralRate;
if (costInEuros > _position.EUROs) {
_portion = _portion * _position.EUROs / costInEuros;
costInEuros = _position.EUROs;
}
_position.EUROs -= costInEuros;
rewards[abi.encodePacked(_position.holder, asset.token.symbol)] += _portion;
burnEuros += costInEuros;
if (asset.token.addr == address(0)) {
nativePurchased += _portion;
} else {
//@audit
IERC20(asset.token.addr).safeTransferFrom(manager, address(this), _portion);
}
}
}
}
positions[holders[j]] = _position;
}
if (burnEuros > 0) IEUROs(EUROs).burn(address(this), burnEuros);
returnUnpurchasedNative(_assets, nativePurchased);
}

As seen, in the instance where the asset is not the NATIVE ETH, the _portion is being transferred in and assumed to be the exact value of what's transferred in, case is that this is problematic as an accounting flaw would be made on the holder's position cause the fee is not accounted for

Impact

As explained in Proof Of COncept this eventually leads to an accounting flaw since the amount of assets that's going to be recorder to have being received would actually be a wrong value.

Recommended Mitigation Steps

Calculate the real amount that's been received by using the check opf the balances before and after this transfer.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

hrishibhat Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

fee-on-transfer

hrishibhat Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Out of scope
Assigned finding tags:

fee-on-transfer

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