The SmartVaultV3.sol conducts swaps without implementing slippage protection, posing a risk of fund loss due to sandwich attacks.
The SmartVaultV3.sol initiates swaps via the Swaps library, which independently computes slippage parameters, leading to inaccuracies. To ensure correct slippage calculations (min/out), they should be computed externally before the swap transaction. Otherwise, the library relies on modified pool values within the transaction, potentially resulting in incorrect min out values.
Users withdrawing their rewards may face a loss of funds due to the vulnerability of swaps being sandwiched.
Manual Review
The transaction's calldata should incorporate slippage parameters, which are then passed to the Swap library. This ensures accurate handling of slippage during the swap operation.
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