The Standard

The Standard
DeFiHardhat
20,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: medium
Valid

Using `block.timestamp` as deadline in swap

Summary

Using block.timestamp as deadline in swap could lead to users getting worse price than expected

Vulnerability Details

In SmartVault::swap, we are using block.timestamp as deadline which means transaction will stay in the mempool for an extensive period of time without reverting which could lead to users getting worse price than expected

function swap(bytes32 _inToken, bytes32 _outToken, uint256 _amount) external onlyOwner {
uint256 swapFee = _amount * ISmartVaultManagerV3(manager).swapFeeRate() / ISmartVaultManagerV3(manager).HUNDRED_PC();
address inToken = getSwapAddressFor(_inToken);
uint256 minimumAmountOut = calculateMinimumAmountOut(_inToken, _outToken, _amount);
ISwapRouter.ExactInputSingleParams memory params = ISwapRouter.ExactInputSingleParams({
tokenIn: inToken,
tokenOut: getSwapAddressFor(_outToken),
fee: 3000,
recipient: address(this),
@> deadline: block.timestamp,
amountIn: _amount - swapFee,
amountOutMinimum: minimumAmountOut,
sqrtPriceLimitX96: 0
});
inToken == ISmartVaultManagerV3(manager).weth() ?
executeNativeSwapAndFee(params, swapFee) :
executeERC20SwapAndFee(params, swapFee);
}

Impact

Users can get worse price

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

Use bounded deadline for swaps

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

hrishibhat Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Invalidated
Reason: Non-acceptable severity
Assigned finding tags:

deadline-check-low

hrishibhat Lead Judge over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

deadline-check

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