The Standard

Summary

Calls to Chainlink oracles can potentially revert, which will result in a DOS to LiquidationPool::distributeAssets().

Vulnerability Details

LiquidationPool::distributeAssets() lacks the needed try-catch logic to catch potential reverts of oracle calls. This may occur for the following reasons:

• Chainlink's multisig can block access to price feeds

• Oracle may malfunction and be temporarily paused

• Oracle might be deprecated and replaced with a different one

Error handling should be implemented to catch various such edge cases that might occur in the future. Also, the contract makes use of the EUR/USD price feed and that one is set in the constructor but can't be changed after deployment.

The following lines are affected by this:

L207:

L218:

Impact

Denial of Service to the LiquidationPool::distributeAssets() function. Potentially a permanent one if the EUR/USD feed gets deprecated and replaced since it can't be changed once deployed.

Check the following resource from OpenZeppelin for additional insights on the potential risks involved with this:
https://blog.openzeppelin.com/secure-smart-contract-guidelines-the-dangers-of-price-oracles/

Tools Used

Manual Analysis

Recommendations

Wrap the calls to latestRoundData() in try/catch blocks and handle the revert scenarios by falling back to a different feed or any other way you deem is appropriate for the use case. You should also add a way to be able to change the EUR/USD once live.