The repayBadDebtWithCash function in the MErc20DelegateFixer contract has several vulnerabilities that could potentially be exploited by malicious actors. These vulnerabilities include lack of proper input validation, allowing the repayment of bad debt by non-bad debtors, and absence of checks to ensure that the amount being repaid does not exceed the current bad debt amount.
The repayBadDebtWithCash
function in the MErc20DelegateFixer
contract lacks proper input validation. This means that the function does not check whether the amount being repaid is valid, leading to potential issues if the amount is negative.
###Repayment by Non-Bad Debtors
There are no checks in place to prevent non-bad debtors from repaying debt using the repayBadDebtWithCash function. This could allow unauthorized users to manipulate the bad debt counter and affect the overall integrity of the protocol.
The vulnerabilities in the repayBadDebtWithCash function pose significant risks to the security and stability of the protocol. Malicious actors could potentially exploit these vulnerabilities to manipulate the bad debt counter, drain funds from the protocol, or disrupt the lending and borrowing process.
No specific tools were used for this competitive audit report. The vulnerabilities were identified through manual code review and analysis.
To address the vulnerabilities identified in the repayBadDebtWithCash
function of the MErc20DelegateFixer
contract, the following recommendations are suggested:
It is essential to include proper input validation checks to ensure that the amount being repaid is valid. Below is an example of how input validation can be added to the function:
To prevent non-bad debtors from using the repayBadDebtWithCash function, additional checks should be implemented to ensure that only bad debtors can repay debt. Here's an example of how this can be achieved:
By implementing these recommendations, the security and integrity of the MErc20DelegateFixer contract can be enhanced, mitigating the identified vulnerabilities.
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