The _transfer
function in the TokenManager
contract incorrectly passes the address(this)
as the argument to the approve
function of the ICapitalPool
contract instead of the ERC20 token address. This could lead to the incorrect approval of token transfers, resulting in failed transfers.
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/main/src/core/TokenManager.sol#L243-L248
The approve
function of the CapitalPool
contract is designed to approve the token manager to spend a specified ERC20 token. However, in the _transfer
function, the address(this)
is passed to the approve
function instead of the ERC20 token address (_token
). This incorrect argument means the approval process is not executed for the intended token, which could prevent the expected transfer from occurring.
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/main/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L24-L39
It calls ICapitalPool(_capitalPoolAddr).approve(address(this));. This passes the address(this) (referring to the TokenManager contract itself) instead of the ERC20 token address (_token). The approval might not be correctly set up for the intended ERC20 token, leading to a failed transfer when attempting to move tokens from the _capitalPoolAddr
.
Manual code review
Replace address(this)
with the correct ERC20 token address (_token
) when calling the approve
function.
This change ensures that the correct token address is passed to the approve
function, thereby allowing the CapitalPool
contract to set up the necessary approvals for token transfers as intended.
If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. The argument up in the air is since the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, the `if` block within the internal `_transfer()` function will never be invoked if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, so the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate.
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