Tadle

Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Infinite withdrawal exists

Summary

As claimable amount is not reduced to zero after transferring therefore infinte withdrawl is possible.

Vulnerability Details

Following is withdraw function

function withdraw(
address _tokenAddress,
TokenBalanceType _tokenBalanceType
) external whenNotPaused {
uint256 claimAbleAmount = userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][
_tokenAddress
][_tokenBalanceType];
if (claimAbleAmount == 0) {
return;
}
address capitalPoolAddr = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.CAPITAL_POOL
);
if (_tokenAddress == wrappedNativeToken) {
/**
* @dev token is native token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
* @dev withdraw native token to token manager contract
* @dev transfer native token to msg sender
*/
_transfer(
wrappedNativeToken,
capitalPoolAddr,
address(this),
claimAbleAmount,
capitalPoolAddr
);
IWrappedNativeToken(wrappedNativeToken).withdraw(claimAbleAmount);
payable(msg.sender).transfer(claimAbleAmount);
} else {
/**
* @dev token is ERC20 token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
*/
_safe_transfer_from(
_tokenAddress,
capitalPoolAddr,
_msgSender(),
claimAbleAmount
);
}
emit Withdraw(
_msgSender(),
_tokenAddress,
_tokenBalanceType,
claimAbleAmount
);
}

From above it is clear that no where the userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][_tokenAddress][_tokenBalanceType] is reduced to zero therefore the user can call again and again this function to drain the funds.

Impact

Infinte withdrawl possible hence draining the contract.

Tools Used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Make the following change

function withdraw(
address _tokenAddress,
TokenBalanceType _tokenBalanceType
) external whenNotPaused {
uint256 claimAbleAmount = userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][
_tokenAddress
][_tokenBalanceType];
if (claimAbleAmount == 0) {
return;
}
address capitalPoolAddr = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.CAPITAL_POOL
);
@==> userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][_tokenAddress][_tokenBalanceType] = 0;
if (_tokenAddress == wrappedNativeToken) {
/**
* @dev token is native token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
* @dev withdraw native token to token manager contract
* @dev transfer native token to msg sender
*/
_transfer(
wrappedNativeToken,
capitalPoolAddr,
address(this),
claimAbleAmount,
capitalPoolAddr
);
IWrappedNativeToken(wrappedNativeToken).withdraw(claimAbleAmount);
payable(msg.sender).transfer(claimAbleAmount);
} else {
/**
* @dev token is ERC20 token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
*/
_safe_transfer_from(
_tokenAddress,
capitalPoolAddr,
_msgSender(),
claimAbleAmount
);
}
emit Withdraw(
_msgSender(),
_tokenAddress,
_tokenBalanceType,
claimAbleAmount
);
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 12 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-TokenManager-withdraw-userTokenBalanceMap-not-reset

Valid critical severity finding, the lack of clearance of the `userTokenBalanceMap` mapping allows complete draining of the CapitalPool contract. Note: This would require the approval issues highlighted in other issues to be fixed first (i.e. wrong approval address within `_transfer` and lack of approvals within `_safe_transfer_from` during ERC20 withdrawals)

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