The _transfer()
function in the tokenManager.sol
contract contains a condition that checks if the token allowance is exactly zero before attempting to approve the transfer. This condition can cause issues, particularly when the allowance is non-zero but less than the transfer amount, leading to a potential failure in processing the transfer.
In the _transfer()
function, there is a check to see if the capital pool's address's token allowance for the contract is equal to zero IERC20(_token).allowance(_from, address(this)) == 0x0
. If true, the contract calls approve to set the allowance. However, this condition fails to account for situations where the allowance is less than the required transfer amount but not zero
, leading to potential transfer failures.
If the allowance is non-zero but insufficient to cover the _amount, the transfer will fail because the contract will not increase the allowance as needed. This could disrupt normal operations and lead to failed transactions.
Manual Review
Change the Condition: Modify the condition to check if the allowance is less than the _amount rather than exactly zero. This will ensure that the contract only attempts to increase the allowance when necessary.
If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. The argument up in the air is since the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, the `if` block within the internal `_transfer()` function will never be invoked if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, so the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate.
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