The SystemConfig::updateReferrerInfo function has a minimal access control which can be bypassed as the function is external.
This allows any user to update referral information for any address, potentially leading to unauthorized manipulation of referral rates and rewards.
A malicious user could simply use another address to set the rate for his main account, easily avoiding the simple restriction _referrer != _msgSender() set:
This vulnerability can be exploited to:
Set arbitrary referral rates for any address, by any address.
Manipulate referral rewards distribution.
Potentially drain funds from the protocol by setting high referral rates for attacker-controlled addresses.
The impact is severe as it defeats the purpose of the access control in place.
Manual review - Testing
Implement proper access control for the updateReferrerInfo function. Only authorized roles (e.g., admin or the referrer themselves) should be able to update referral information.
Valid high severity. There are two impacts here due to the wrong setting of the `refferalInfoMap` mapping. 1. Wrong refferal info is always set, so the refferal will always be delegated to the refferer address instead of the caller 2. Anybody can arbitrarily change the referrer and referrer rate of any user, resulting in gaming of the refferal system I prefer #1500 description the most, be cause it seems to be the only issue although without a poc to fully describe all of the possible impacts
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.