Submission Details
Severity:
`TokenManager::tillIn` does not revert on 0 amount, which might lead to wrong caulciations and unexpected errors
Summary
The tillIn function get called when the protocol want to transfer tokens from the user to the CapitalPool:
/**
* @notice Till in, Transfer token from msg sender to capital pool
* @param _accountAddress Account address
* @param _tokenAddress Token address
* @param _amount Transfer amount
* @param _isPointToken The transfer token is pointToken
* @notice Capital pool should be deployed
* @dev Support ERC20 token and native token
*/
function tillIn(
address _accountAddress,
address _tokenAddress,
uint256 _amount,
bool _isPointToken
)
external
payable
onlyRelatedContracts(tadleFactory, _msgSender())
onlyInTokenWhiteList(_isPointToken, _tokenAddress)
{
/// @notice return if amount is 0
@> if (_amount == 0) {
@> return;
}
address capitalPoolAddr = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.CAPITAL_POOL
);
if (capitalPoolAddr == address(0x0)) {
revert Errors.ContractIsNotDeployed();
}
if (_tokenAddress == wrappedNativeToken) {
/**
* @dev token is native token
* @notice check msg value
* @dev if msg value is less than _amount, revert
* @dev wrap native token and transfer to capital pool
*/
if (msg.value < _amount) {
revert Errors.NotEnoughMsgValue(msg.value, _amount);
}
IWrappedNativeToken(wrappedNativeToken).deposit{value: _amount}();
_safe_transfer(wrappedNativeToken, capitalPoolAddr, _amount);
} else {
/// @notice token is ERC20 token
_transfer(
_tokenAddress,
_accountAddress,
capitalPoolAddr,
_amount,
capitalPoolAddr
);
}
emit TillIn(_accountAddress, _tokenAddress, _amount, _isPointToken);
}
Vulnerability Details
However, the current implementation of the function, uses a wrong logic on 0 amount as input, and it uses return keyword, instead of revert.
@> if (_amount == 0) {
@> return;
}
Impact
this implementation, especially together with other calculations in the current contracts implementation, might lead to unexpected errors and wrong calculations, and can be a source of exploit.
Tools Used
Manual Review
Recommendations
if _amount is 0, the whole function should revert.
Prize pool breakdown
Total prize
27,750 USDC
nSLOC
1,22923
USDC / LOC
25,000 USDC
2,750 USDC
2,250 USDC
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