Tadle
Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
View results
Previous Next
Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`TokenManager::withdraw` never updates the `userTokenBalanceMap`, therefore users can call `withdraw` multiple number of times

amaron

Summary

the withdraw function allows the users to claim their tokens. the tokens amounts are being stored in the mappning userTokenBalanceMap, however the function never updates this mapping on withdrawal, therefore, users will be able to withdraw multiple times.

Vulnerability Details

the function

/**
* @notice Withdraw
* @dev Caller must be owner
* @param _tokenAddress Token address
* @param _tokenBalanceType Token balance type
*/
function withdraw(
address _tokenAddress,
TokenBalanceType _tokenBalanceType
) external whenNotPaused {
uint256 claimAbleAmount = userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][
_tokenAddress
][_tokenBalanceType];
​
if (claimAbleAmount == 0) {
return;
}
​
address capitalPoolAddr = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.CAPITAL_POOL
);
​
if (_tokenAddress == wrappedNativeToken) {
/**
* @dev token is native token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
* @dev withdraw native token to token manager contract
* @dev transfer native token to msg sender
*/
_transfer(
wrappedNativeToken,
capitalPoolAddr,
address(this),
claimAbleAmount,
capitalPoolAddr
);
​
IWrappedNativeToken(wrappedNativeToken).withdraw(claimAbleAmount);
payable(msg.sender).transfer(claimAbleAmount);
} else {
/**
* @dev token is ERC20 token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
*/
_safe_transfer_from(
_tokenAddress,
capitalPoolAddr,
_msgSender(),
claimAbleAmount
);
}
​
emit Withdraw(
_msgSender(),
_tokenAddress,
_tokenBalanceType,
claimAbleAmount
);
}

never updates the userTokenBalanceMap mapping, so users can call this function as long as there are tokens in the contract.

Impact

this might cause severe loss of funds for all the protocol users.

Tools Used

manual review

Recommendations

update userTokenBalanceMap while taking into consideration reentrancy attacks.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge about 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-TokenManager-withdraw-userTokenBalanceMap-not-reset

Valid critical severity finding, the lack of clearance of the `userTokenBalanceMap` mapping allows complete draining of the CapitalPool contract. Note: This would require the approval issues highlighted in other issues to be fixed first (i.e. wrong approval address within `_transfer` and lack of approvals within `_safe_transfer_from` during ERC20 withdrawals)

Support

FAQs

Can't find an answer? Chat with us on Discord, Twitter or Linkedin.