CapitalPool: approve() function does not have any access control in place, hence it is vulnerable to being used in malicious ways.
The absence of access control opens the door for any malicious user to get approval on a tailored token.
A malicious token can be injected into the protocol. however, it is of a medium impact as it can not be whitelisted without Tokenmanager approval.
Manual review
Add the following check after L27 in Capitalpool.sol
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
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