The approve
function in the CapitalPool
contract grants an unlimited approval to the TokenManager
contract by setting the approval amount to type(uint256).max
. This approach poses significant security risks, as it grants unrestricted access to all tokens of that type. If an attacker compromises the TokenManager
contract, user funds could be stolen.
The approve
function in the CapitalPool
contract is defined as follows:
In this implementation, the function uses type(uint256).max
as the approval amount, which effectively grants unlimited access to the TokenManager
contract. This can be risky due to the following reasons:
Security Risk: An unlimited approval means that if an attacker gains control over the TokenManager
contract or exploits a vulnerability within it, they could potentially transfer all tokens from the user’s account. This represents a significant security risk and could result in the loss of user funds.
Security Standards: Security standards recommend using specific amounts for approvals. This limits the potential damage if a contract is compromised and follows the principle of least privilege, which minimizes the scope of potential attacks.
The use of unlimited approvals increases the risk of funds being stolen if the TokenManager
contract is compromised or if there is a vulnerability within the contract. Users' funds could be at significant risk, as the approval allows for unrestricted access to the token balances.
VSCode
To mitigate this risk, update the approve
function to allow specifying a specific uint256
amount instead of using type(uint256).max
. This change ensures that the approval is limited to a defined amount, reducing the risk of total loss if the TokenManager
contract is compromised.
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
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