When a user has a claimable balance, he call the withdraw
function (L-137) in the tokenManager
, which transfers the tokens from the capital pool to the msg.sender and calls the approve function in the capital pool, allowing the capital pool to approve itself to transfer the tokens from the capital pool to the sender. However, this call will consistently revert because the capital pool calls the approve function in the tokenManager, which has not implemented this function.
When a user tries to withdraw, the user calls the withdraw
function (L-137) in the tokenManager. If the token to be withdrawn is the native token, then the `_transfer` function (L-186) is used, and this block of code will be executed :
And the approve
function (L-24) of the capitalPool will be executed:
But this call will revert because it will perform a low-level call to the tokenManager as the argument used to call approve is address(this)
within the tokenManager.
It will be impossible to withdraw any amount if the token is the native token
Manual Review
Change de _transfer
function to approve with the token address like this :
If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. The argument up in the air is since the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, the `if` block within the internal `_transfer()` function will never be invoked if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, so the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate.
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