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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Funds are stuck in the protocol because of `approve(address(this))`

tnevler

Summary

The TokenManager::_transfer function is used to transfer tokens. However, it calls the CapitalPool:approve function with an incorrect input parameter, which prevents the retrieval of available funds.

Vulnerability

The CapitalPool:approve function expects the token address as an input parameter:

/**
* @dev Approve token for token manager
* @notice only can be called by token manager
@> * @param tokenAddr address of token
*/
function approve(address tokenAddr) external {
address tokenManager = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.TOKEN_MANAGER
);
(bool success, ) = tokenAddr.call(
abi.encodeWithSelector(
APPROVE_SELECTOR,
tokenManager,
type(uint256).max
)
);
​
if (!success) {
revert ApproveFailed();
}
}

However, the TokenManager::_transfer function incorrectly passes the token manager address (address(this)) as an input parameter.

Code Snippet

function _transfer(
address _token,
address _from,
address _to,
uint256 _amount,
address _capitalPoolAddr
) internal {
uint256 fromBalanceBef = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_from);
uint256 toBalanceBef = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_to);
​
if (
_from == _capitalPoolAddr &&
IERC20(_token).allowance(_from, address(this)) == 0x0
) {
@> ICapitalPool(_capitalPoolAddr).approve(address(this));
}
​
_safe_transfer_from(_token, _from, _to, _amount);
​
uint256 fromBalanceAft = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_from);
uint256 toBalanceAft = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_to);
​
if (fromBalanceAft != fromBalanceBef - _amount) {
revert TransferFailed();
}
​
if (toBalanceAft != toBalanceBef + _amount) {
revert TransferFailed();
}
}

Impact

The vulnerability prevents users from withdrawing available funds from the protocol. As the result, all the assets sent to the contract would be stuck.

Proof Of Concept

  1. User calls PreMarket::createOffer function, sending 0.012 ether to the protocol.

  2. User1 calls PreMarket:createTaker function, sending 0.005175 ether to the protocol.

  3. User calls withdraw() function, and it reverts with ApproveFailed error.

Place this into the PreMarkets.t.sol file and execute the following command:

forge test --mt test_withdrawRevertsBecauseApproveAddressThis -vv

error ApproveFailed();
function test_withdrawRevertsBecauseApproveAddressThis() public {
deal(user, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
deal(user1, 100000000 * 10 ** 18);
​
vm.startPrank(user);
preMarktes.createOffer{value: 0.012 * 1e18}(
CreateOfferParams(
marketPlace,
address(weth9),
1000,
0.01 * 1e18,
12000,
300,
OfferType.Ask,
OfferSettleType.Protected
)
);
vm.stopPrank();
​
vm.startPrank(user1);
address offerAddr = GenerateAddress.generateOfferAddress(0);
preMarktes.createTaker{value: 0.005175 * 1e18}(offerAddr, 500);
vm.stopPrank();
​
vm.startPrank(user);
vm.expectRevert(ApproveFailed.selector);
tokenManager.withdraw(address(weth9), TokenBalanceType.SalesRevenue);
vm.stopPrank();
}

Tools Used

Manual testing

Foundry

Recommended Mitigation

It is recommended to change the input parameter:

function _transfer(
address _token,
address _from,
address _to,
uint256 _amount,
address _capitalPoolAddr
) internal {
uint256 fromBalanceBef = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_from);
uint256 toBalanceBef = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_to);
​
if (
_from == _capitalPoolAddr &&
IERC20(_token).allowance(_from, address(this)) == 0x0
) {
- ICapitalPool(_capitalPoolAddr).approve(address(this));
+ ICapitalPool(_capitalPoolAddr).approve(_token);
}
​
_safe_transfer_from(_token, _from, _to, _amount);
​
uint256 fromBalanceAft = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_from);
uint256 toBalanceAft = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_to);
​
if (fromBalanceAft != fromBalanceBef - _amount) {
revert TransferFailed();
}
​
if (toBalanceAft != toBalanceBef + _amount) {
revert TransferFailed();
}
}
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 12 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-TokenManager-approve-wrong-address-input

If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. The argument up in the air is since the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, the `if` block within the internal `_transfer()` function will never be invoked if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, so the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate.

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