Tadle
Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

griefing attack: anyone can update referrer rate of other user

zukanopro

Summary

Vulnerability Details

In updateReferrerInfo function, anyone can set referrer rate for anyone

function updateReferrerInfo(
address _referrer,
uint256 _referrerRate,
uint256 _authorityRate
) external {
if (_msgSender() == _referrer) {
revert InvalidReferrer(_referrer); <-
}
​
. . . . . . .
uint256 referralExtraRate = referralExtraRateMap[_referrer];
uint256 totalRate = baseReferralRate + referralExtraRate;
​
if (totalRate > Constants.REFERRAL_RATE_DECIMAL_SCALER) {
revert InvalidTotalRate(totalRate);
}
​
if (_referrerRate + _authorityRate != totalRate) {
revert InvalidRate(_referrerRate, _authorityRate, totalRate);
}
​
ReferralInfo storage referralInfo = referralInfoMap[_referrer];
referralInfo.referrer = _referrer;
referralInfo.referrerRate = _referrerRate;
referralInfo.authorityRate = _authorityRate;
​
emit UpdateReferrerInfo(
msg.sender,
_referrer,
_referrerRate,
_authorityRate
);
}

Referrer reward is sent when creating taker:

function createTaker(address _offer, uint256 _points) external payable {
. . . .
uint256 remainingPlatformFee = _updateReferralBonus(
platformFee,
depositAmount,
stockAddr,
makerInfo,
referralInfo,
tokenManager
);
. . . .
}

_updateReferralBonus function:

function _updateReferralBonus(
uint256 platformFee,
uint256 depositAmount,
address stockAddr,
MakerInfo storage makerInfo,
ReferralInfo memory referralInfo,
ITokenManager tokenManager
) internal returns (uint256 remainingPlatformFee) {
. . . . . .
uint256 referrerReferralBonus = platformFee.mulDiv(
referralInfo.referrerRate,
Constants.REFERRAL_RATE_DECIMAL_SCALER,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
​
/**
* @dev update referrer referral bonus
* @dev update authority referral bonus
*/
tokenManager.addTokenBalance(
TokenBalanceType.ReferralBonus,
referralInfo.referrer, <-
makerInfo.tokenAddress,
referrerReferralBonus
);
uint256 authorityReferralBonus = platformFee.mulDiv(
referralInfo.authorityRate,
Constants.REFERRAL_RATE_DECIMAL_SCALER,
Math.Rounding.Floor
);
​
tokenManager.addTokenBalance(
TokenBalanceType.ReferralBonus,
_msgSender(), <-
makerInfo.tokenAddress,
authorityReferralBonus
);
. . . . . .
}

Authority (people who create taker) can use this way to update referrer rate and reduce number of token need to be paid. Moreover, referrer can only set for themself, which make referrer mechanism does not work correctly

Impact

Referrer can lose reward

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

Update referrer mechanism

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 12 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-SystemConfig-updateReferrerInfo-msgSender

Valid high severity. There are two impacts here due to the wrong setting of the `refferalInfoMap` mapping. 1. Wrong refferal info is always set, so the refferal will always be delegated to the refferer address instead of the caller 2. Anybody can arbitrarily change the referrer and referrer rate of any user, resulting in gaming of the refferal system I prefer #1500 description the most, be cause it seems to be the only issue although without a poc to fully describe all of the possible impacts

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