The CapitalPool
contract contains an approve function that lacks proper access control, allowing any external actor to approve unlimited spending of any token by the TokenManager
.
In the CapitalPool
contract, the approve function is intended to be called only by the TokenManager
, as indicated by the comment. However, there is no access control implemented:
This function allows any caller to approve the TokenManager
to spend an unlimited amount (type(uint256).max)
of any token held by the CapitalPool
.
Any user can approve the TokenManager
to spend tokens from the CapitalPool
, which is not the intended behavior.
Manual Review
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.