SystemConfig::updateReferrerInfo
allows anyone to set a referrer without any validation , as a result a malicious actor can set a secondary wallet as their referrer and recieve back the 30% of platform fee they pay for any transaction.
SystemConfig::updateReferrerInfo
does not have suffucient validation to verify if the referrer is actually a valid referrer
It only checks that _msgSender() != _referrer
and _referrer
is not address(0x0)
. This means any address can be set as a referrer even if that address doesn't have a referrer id and is not a valid referrer.
MEDIUM - impact on protocol's generated revenue
Manual Review
SystemConfig::updateReferrerInfo
should have access control - like a REFERRER_UPDATER_ROLE to update the referrer info of a user.
Protocol should use off-chain logic to verify that the referrer is valid(perhaps based on the generated referral id) and update the user's referrer info via REFERRER_UPDATER_ROLE account(or bots).
Valid high severity. There are two impacts here due to the wrong setting of the `refferalInfoMap` mapping. 1. Wrong refferal info is always set, so the refferal will always be delegated to the refferer address instead of the caller 2. Anybody can arbitrarily change the referrer and referrer rate of any user, resulting in gaming of the refferal system I prefer #1500 description the most, be cause it seems to be the only issue although without a poc to fully describe all of the possible impacts
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