Tadle
Tadle
DeFi
30,000 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: low
Valid

Anyone can call "approve"

bareli

Summary

Any one can approve tokenManager totype(uint256).max.There is no modifier.

Vulnerability Details

*/
function approve(address tokenAddr) external {
address tokenManager = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.TOKEN_MANAGER
);
@>> (bool success, ) = tokenAddr.call(
abi.encodeWithSelector(
APPROVE_SELECTOR,
tokenManager,
type(uint256).max
)
);
​
if (!success) {
revert ApproveFailed();
}
}
​
https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/main/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L24

}

Impact

Any one can call the function approve and approve the tokenmanger.

Tools Used

Recommendations

use a modifier to restrict the calling of function approve.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 10 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-CapitalPool-approve-missing-access-control

This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.

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