The tillIn
and withdraw
functions in TokenManager.sol
will malfunction because an incorrect argument given to the approve
function of CapitalPool.sol
in the _transfer
function.
TokenManager.sol
has an interanl _transfer
function used to transfer tokens to and from the CapitalPool.sol
contract. If tokens are transfered from the CapitalPool and the allowance of TokenManager.sol
is 0 then TokenManager.sol
calls CapitalPool:approve
to give max allowance to TokenManager.sol
to transfer any amount of _token
from CapitalPool.
CapitalPool:approve
takes the _token's address that is approved to be used by TokenManager as an argument. When the function is called in TokenManager, address(this)
is given as the argument instead of the token address to call approve. This causes the _transfer function in TokenManager to revert if the contract does not have approval for the token beforehand.
TokenManager:tillIn
and TokenManager:withdraw
functions will not be callable until the CapitalPool:approve
function is called directly.
Replace address(this)
with _token
on TokenManager.sol#L247.
If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. The argument up in the air is since the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, the `if` block within the internal `_transfer()` function will never be invoked if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, so the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate.
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