Tadle
Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

Tokens can be stolen since `claimAbleAmount` is not updated

pontifex

Summary

Users can drain the protocol balance via the TokenManager.withdraw function since their claimAbleAmount is not decreased.

Vulnerability Details

The TokenManager.withdraw function lets withdraw tokens from users virtual balances when claimAbleAmount is not zero. The problem is the userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][_tokenAddress][_tokenBalanceType] variable is not decreased and users can withdraw the same amount many times.

function withdraw(
address _tokenAddress,
TokenBalanceType _tokenBalanceType
) external whenNotPaused {
>> uint256 claimAbleAmount = userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][
_tokenAddress
][_tokenBalanceType];
​
>> if (claimAbleAmount == 0) {
return;
}
​
address capitalPoolAddr = tadleFactory.relatedContracts(
RelatedContractLibraries.CAPITAL_POOL
);
​
if (_tokenAddress == wrappedNativeToken) {
/**
* @dev token is native token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
* @dev withdraw native token to token manager contract
* @dev transfer native token to msg sender
*/
_transfer(
wrappedNativeToken,
capitalPoolAddr,
address(this),
claimAbleAmount,
capitalPoolAddr
);
​
IWrappedNativeToken(wrappedNativeToken).withdraw(claimAbleAmount);
payable(msg.sender).transfer(claimAbleAmount);
} else {
/**
* @dev token is ERC20 token
* @dev transfer from capital pool to msg sender
*/
_safe_transfer_from(
_tokenAddress,
capitalPoolAddr,
_msgSender(),
claimAbleAmount
);
}
​
emit Withdraw(
_msgSender(),
_tokenAddress,
_tokenBalanceType,
claimAbleAmount
);
}

Impact

Assets losses without special conditions.

Tools used

Manual Review

Recommendations

Consider decreasing the userTokenBalanceMap[_msgSender()][_tokenAddress][_tokenBalanceType] variable before transferring assets.

Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge 12 months ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-TokenManager-withdraw-userTokenBalanceMap-not-reset

Valid critical severity finding, the lack of clearance of the `userTokenBalanceMap` mapping allows complete draining of the CapitalPool contract. Note: This would require the approval issues highlighted in other issues to be fixed first (i.e. wrong approval address within `_transfer` and lack of approvals within `_safe_transfer_from` during ERC20 withdrawals)

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