Tadle
Tadle
DeFiFoundry
27,750 USDC
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Submission Details
Severity: high
Valid

`TokenManager::_transfer(...)` function set invalid address to the `CapitalPool::approve(...)` function, leading to failed transfers

0xb0k0

Summary

Tadle allows its token manager contract to set proper approval to the capital pool so that it can seamlessly transfer funds in and out. However, the TokenManager.solcontract sends the invalid address to the approve()function.

Vulnerability Details

The TokenManagercontract acts as a relay of transferring funds between users and the CapitalPooland vice-versa. It invokes the CapitalPool::approve(...)function, which sets the maximum allowed approval for the given token. However, currently, when the TokenManager contracts transfers funds, it sends its contract address instead of the token address:

function _transfer(
address _token,
address _from,
address _to,
uint256 _amount,
address _capitalPoolAddr
) internal {
uint256 fromBalanceBef = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_from);
uint256 toBalanceBef = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_to);
​
if (
_from == _capitalPoolAddr &&
IERC20(_token).allowance(_from, address(this)) == 0x0
) {
@> ICapitalPool(_capitalPoolAddr).approve(address(this)); // this needs to be the token address
}
​
_safe_transfer_from(_token, _from, _to, _amount);
​
uint256 fromBalanceAft = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_from);
uint256 toBalanceAft = IERC20(_token).balanceOf(_to);
​
if (fromBalanceAft != fromBalanceBef - _amount) {
revert TransferFailed();
}
​
if (toBalanceAft != toBalanceBef + _amount) {
revert TransferFailed();
}
}

Because of this the CapitalPool will not be able to properly set the required token approvals, leading to failed transfers.

Impact

Funds cannot be transferred in the protocol.

Tools Used

Manual review

Recommendations

Send the token address to the CapitalPool::approve(...) function in TokenManager::_transfer(...) instead of sending the TokenManagercontract address.

@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ contract TokenManager is
_from == _capitalPoolAddr &&
IERC20(_token).allowance(_from, address(this)) == 0x0
) {
- ICapitalPool(_capitalPoolAddr).approve(address(this));
+ ICapitalPool(_capitalPoolAddr).approve(_token);
}
_safe_transfer_from(_token, _from, _to, _amount);
Updates

Lead Judging Commences

0xnevi Lead Judge about 1 year ago
Submission Judgement Published
Validated
Assigned finding tags:

finding-TokenManager-approve-wrong-address-input

If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. The argument up in the air is since the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, the `if` block within the internal `_transfer()` function will never be invoked if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, so the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate.

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