TokenManager has withdraw function, that does not reset the claimAbleAmount after withdraw, so malicious user could withdraw several times if capital pool has balance.
In the above code, the protocol does not reset userTokenBalanceMap value after success to send.
The malicious user could withdraw several times if capital pool has balance.
Manual Review
We need reset userTokenBalanceMap value after withdraw success.
Valid critical severity finding, the lack of clearance of the `userTokenBalanceMap` mapping allows complete draining of the CapitalPool contract. Note: This would require the approval issues highlighted in other issues to be fixed first (i.e. wrong approval address within `_transfer` and lack of approvals within `_safe_transfer_from` during ERC20 withdrawals)
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