No access control in CapitalPool.approve()
Summary
No access control in CapitalPool.approve()
Vulnerability Details
The natspec says that only the tokenManager can call the function.
However there is no check on msg.sender. As a result, anyone can call the approve()function.
Impact
Anyone can pass in any tokenAddr and have it provide max approval to the tokenManager
Tools Used
Manual Review
Recommendations
Assert that msg.sender is the tokenManager
Lead Judging Commences
finding-CapitalPool-approve-missing-access-control
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
Prize pool breakdown
Live
The contest is live. Earn rewards by submitting a finding.
Appeals
This is your time to appeal against judgements on your submissions.
Appeals Review
Appeals are being carefully reviewed by our judges.