The approve function lacks proper access control mechanisms. Despite the comment indicating that it should only be callable by the token manager, there's no actual check in place to enforce this restriction.
Any external actor can call this function, potentially leading to unauthorized approvals. This could result in the capital pool granting spending rights to unintended parties.
Any external actor can call this function, potentially leading to unauthorized approvals. This could result in the capital pool granting spending rights to unintended parties.
Manual Review
Implement a modifier or require statement to check the caller's identity
This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
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