_safe_transfer_from() is used in tokenManager:withdraw() instead of _transfer(), breaking the withdraw() functionality
A user can withdraw his tokens from capitalPool using tokenManager:withdraw(). If tokenAddress is not wrappedNativeToken ie tokenAddress != wrappedNativeToken then it goes to else statement, where it calls _safe_transfer_from()
Now this is a problem because _safe_transfer_from() is directly transferring token from capitalPool to _msg.sender() but there is no approval from capitalPool to tokenManager. As result, if token is not wrappedNativeToken then withdraw() will revert due to insufficient allowance issue
//Here is PoC
Users will not be able to withdraw tokens, if token is not wrappedNativeToken
Manual Review
Use _transfer() instead of _safe_transfer_from(), just like we used in if statement ie when token = wrappedNativeToken
This issue's severity has similar reasonings to #252, whereby If we consider the correct permissioned implementation for the `approve()` function within `CapitalPool.sol`, this would be a critical severity issue, because the withdrawal of funds will be permanently blocked and must be rescued by the admin via the `Rescuable.sol` contract, given it will always revert [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/core/CapitalPool.sol#L36-L38) when attempting to call a non-existent function selector `approve` within the TokenManager contract. Similarly, the argument here is the approval function `approve` was made permisionless, so if somebody beforehand calls approval for the TokenManager for the required token, the transfer will infact not revert when a withdrawal is invoked. I will leave open for escalation discussions, but based on my first point, I believe high severity is appropriate. It also has a slightly different root cause and fix whereby an explicit approval needs to be provided before a call to `_safe_transfer_from()`, if not, the alternative `_transfer()` function should be used to provide an approval, assuming a fix was implemented for issue #252
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