The CapitalPool::approve function can be called by any user, despite documentation specifying that it should only be callable by the token manager.
As shown in the code below, the approve function does not ensure that only the token manager can call it. This lack of access control allows any user to invoke the function.
A user could mistakenly or maliciously approve a contract with maximum allowance, leading to potential loss of funds or unauthorized contract interaction.
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This is at most low severity, even though giving max approvals shouldn't be permisionless, the respective tokenManager address is retrieved from the TadleFactory contract whereby the trusted guardian role is responsible for deploying such contracts as seen [here](https://github.com/Cyfrin/2024-08-tadle/blob/04fd8634701697184a3f3a5558b41c109866e5f8/src/factory/TadleFactory.sol#L68). Since the user still has to go through the PreMarkets/DeliveryPlace contracts to perform market actions, this max approval cannot be exploited.
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